Author: waleedt

  • The Court of Appeal Decision in Jet2 Holidays Limited v Hughes & Hughes [2019] on Contempt of Court Jurisdiction – A Year On.

    The Court of Appeal Decision in Jet2 Holidays Limited v Hughes & Hughes [2019] on Contempt of Court Jurisdiction – A Year On.

    Subject: The impact of the findings in the Jet2 Holidays Limited v Hughes & Hughes [2019] EWCA Civ 1858 on the development of the Pre-Action Protocol, as considered by the Civil Justice Council.

    Late last year the Court of Appeal handed down a landmark ruling confirming that the High Court did have jurisdiction to commit the respondents in the Jet2 Holidays Limited v Hughes & Hughes [2019] EWCA Civ 1858 for contempt of court for submitting false statements of truth at the pre-action protocol stage. A year on, the Civil Justice Council is considering the effects of the findings of Sir Terence Etherton MR, Hamblen LJ (now Lord Hamblen, Justice of the UKSC), and Flaux LJ in the context of Pre-Action Protocol Review. 

    In the Jet2 Holidays Limited, the respondents booked an all-inclusive package holiday with the appellant. The respondents later gave notice to the appellant of a claim for damages for holiday sickness – they alleged that they had contracted food poisoning as a result of eating contaminated food or drink at the hotel. In purported compliance with the Personal Injury Claims Pre-Action Protocol (PAP) each respondent provided the appellant with witness statements describing how they believed their sickness was caused as a result of the undercooked food and unhygienic conditions in the Spanish hotel. Each respondent signed a statement of truth contained within their respective witness statements. 

    The appellant subsequently obtained various images, videos and comments posted by the respondents on social media during their holiday on which both respondents and their children appeared physically well and seemed to be having an enjoyable stay at the hotel. The appellants rejected the respondents’ potential claim, and the respondents decided not to pursue their claim for damages further. As a result, the proceedings were never issued against the appellant. 

    In turn, the appellant sought permission to commence committal proceedings against the respondents for the contempt of court under CPR Part 81 on the basis that the allegedly false witness statements were made by the respondents, verified by a statement of truth, contrary to CPR r.32.14. HHJ Godsmark QC, sitting as Deputy High Court Judge, granted permission and listed the committal proceedings for a CCMC. However, at the CCMC hearing, which was listed before a different judge, a question arose as to whether or not the High Court had jurisdiction to commit in the light of the fact that no proceedings had ever been issued. Eventually, HHJ Robert Owen QC concluded that the High Court did not have such jurisdiction and struck out the application.

    On the appeal from that decision the Court of Appeal unanimously held that the High Court did in fact have jurisdiction to commit for contempt of court even though no claim for damages had been issued. It was held that it was sufficient that the false statements, endorsed by the statements of truth, were used during the pre-action protocol stage. In the words of the Lords Justices: 

    “36. A dishonest witness statement served in purported compliance with a PAP is capable of interfering with the due administration of justice for the purposes of engaging the jurisdiction to commit for contempt because PAPs are now an integral and highly important part of litigation architecture.”

    The decision has had a significant impact on the law around contempt and how the parties view pre-action correspondence. Firstly, CPR r.32.14 has been amended to reflect the Jet2 Holidays Limited v Hughes decision. 

    Secondly, the rules around bringing contempt proceedings have been simplified by the introduction of an updated version of CPR Part 81, which came into in force on 1 October 2020. The new version of Part 81 has reduced the number of rules from 38 to 10, which lay out a clear procedure for the commencement of contempt of court proceedings. The new approach for punishment in contempt proceedings was considered by the High Court in the recent decision in Oliver v Shaikh [2020] EWHC 2658 (QB).

    Thirdly, the Civil Justice Council (CJC) has launched a review of the Pre-action Protocols. The CJC is currently running a survey inviting anyone with experience of, or an interest in, Civil Procedure Rules to express their views on Pre-action Protocols. The survey will be open until Friday 18 December 2020. 

  • New UK Anti Money Laundering Regulations

    New UK Anti Money Laundering Regulations

    The new Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance Amendments Regulations 2019 (“The Regulations”) comes into effect from 10 January 2020 and will directly impact the art sector.

    It’s a surprising move on the part of the UK Government but, many would argue, overdue given the art sector has been long regarded as an ideal playground for money laundering activities.

    WHO DOES THIS AFFECT?

    Essentially, most people or organisations that deal in art – including, but not limited to:

    • Art dealers;
    • Auction houses;
    • Galleries;
    • Any firm or sole trader.

    SO, WHAT’S NEW?

    The European Union’s Fifth Money Laundering Directive (“5AMLD”) has now been implement in the form The Regulations and targets, amongst other sectors, “art market participants”.

    So, from 10 January 2020, the UK art market will be designated as a “regulated” market for compliance purposes.

    WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?

    In short, there will be a major overhaul in practices within the art market.

    Art market “participants”, which include owners and senior members, will now need to undertake proper checks on customers and take a “risk-based approach” to compliance. Previously, this only extended to those identified as “high value dealers”, but it now applies across the board.

    Art market participants who are establishing a business relationship or involved in a transaction (or linked series of transactions) worth €10,000 or more must now complete a process of “Client Due Diligence” (“CDD”) before business dealings or handling monies. These are similar checks that are carried out by banks, law firms etc, and includes the obtaining of documents such as photographic ID and proof of address.

    Of note is that the €10,000 threshold is not limited to payment type – it applies to any payments in cash, cheque, bank transfer or any other payment methods.

    Importantly, there is also a registration requirement: art participants will now need to register with HM Revenue & Customs (“HMRC”), the UK’s Supervising Authority, within one year.

    Further requirements include the need to appoint a Money Laundering Compliance Officer (“MLRO”) to supervise compliance, report suspicious activities, review staff compliance training and so forth.

    There is therefore a requirement to commit significant financial resources and time to ensuring compliance, and with the threat of potentially severe consequences for failures to comply  not least to one’s reputation.

    NON-COMPLIANCE

    Failure to comply can lead to fines or a prosecution against institutions, their directors and senior management – and so it is essential for any person or business to take immediate steps to ensure they do not fall foul!

    FURTHER GUIDANCE

    There is currently little in the way of industry guidance available, but The British Art Market Federation (“BAMF”) will be issuing guidance shortly – so watch this space.

    HOW CAN WE HELP?

    Establishing a compliance system to meet the obligations imposed by The Regulations may be daunting, so any affected person or entity is best advised to seek expert advice sooner rather than later – as with anything else, prevention is better than a cure.

    If you would like to discuss the implementation of an effective compliance programme or have been made subject of a regulatory/criminal investigation, we offer expert advice, assistance and representation.

    Should you have any queries with regard to this article, please do not hesitate to contact us via email: mail@eldwicklaw.com, or telephone: +44(0)203 972 8469.

    Abbas Nawrozzadeh is a Senior Solicitor specialising in Regulatory Law and White-Collar Crime at Eldwick Law.

  • Relief from Sanctions: is the CPR obstructing access to justice?

    Relief from Sanctions: is the CPR obstructing access to justice?

    Our Commercial Litigation solicitors comment on this ever changing and important area of litigation law: application for relief from sanctions.

    The 2013 Jackson reforms brought changes to the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) relating to, inter alia, applications for relief from sanctions; in essence, the courts were less tolerant of breaches of the Rules and unjustified delays. The court’s approach was then updated to allow Judges to have further discretion in applications for relief. However, despite the reforms, the court’s approach to Litigants in Person remains stringent. With the reduction in Legal Aid and Conditional Fee Agreements, there is an increase in the number of individuals acting without legal assistance. Whilst the court is required to treat both represented and unrepresented parties on a level playing field, should the court be more flexible with Litigants in Person?

    A stringent approach to application for relief from sanctions

    The court interpreted the test in Mitchell v Newsgroup Newspapers [2013] EWCA Civ 1537 and took a ‘no nonsense’ approach towards applications for relief from sanctions. In circumstances where the breach was ‘trivial’, the party seeking relief was usually granted relief provided that an application was made promptly. On the other hand, if the breach could not be characterised as ‘trivial’, then the burden is on the defaulting party to persuade the court to grant relief. Essentially, this case made it clear that if there was a very good reason for the breach or failure to comply, then relief will usually be granted. This sled to an increase in satellite litigation.

    A more flexible approach

    However, the Court of Appeal in Denton v TH White Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 906 considered Mitchell to be misunderstood and clarified the points made by adopting a more tempered three stage test for applications. The court also warned of the substantial costs that could be imposed on those parties who were unreasonably trying to take tactical advantage of an opponent’s breach and implemented further factors to consider. In Denton it was ruled that in every case, the court must consider all of the circumstances. The test requires:

    1. the court to identify and assess the seriousness and significance of the failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order;
    2. the court should consider why the default occurred;
    3. the court should evaluate all circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application.

    Therefore, if there is a serious or significant breach and there is no good reason for the breach, then an application for relief from sanctions will not automatically fail as it had done in the past. The courts no longer focus on the triviality of the breach, unless it is used to decide whether the breach was serious or significant.

    Litigants in person

    Despite Denton allowing the court further discretion, it took a strict line approach in Barton Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12. The Supreme Court held that Litigants in Person will not receive special consideration if they have failed to comply with the CPR.

    This case concerned the service of a professional negligence claim upon the defendant’s former solicitors. The claimant served his claim form by way of email, without checking whether the defendant would accept service in this way. When the claimant informed the defendant that he was effecting service, the firm refused to acknowledge service via email, despite the expiry of the limitation period the following day. The claimant’s application to extend service of the claim form was rejected at first instance and later in two appeals. Lord Sumption commented that whilst the status of a Litigant in Person permits a “lower standard of compliance with rules or orders of the court”, the claimant had still had a duty to follow the provisions of the CPR, and it failed to do so in this case.

    The Judge went on to comment that the Rules are available to lay persons online, and are therefore readily accessible to Litigants in Person. However, what makes this quite a contradictory approach is that on the one hand the court advocates the use of the internet for lay people to search for the Rules, yet the Rules themselves still allow firms to deny service via email. Email communication has become the most used communication methods between firms, their clients, and other businesses professionals. If a lay person is encouraged to search for these Rules online, then it should follow that the CPR be updated to allow service by email. The Business and Property courts themselves have introduced ‘legal tech’ such as CE file into their systems to allow for a smoother operation of the court process. In fact, Lord Briggs in his dissent of Barton stated:

    “Now that issue and filing is required to be carried out online, by legally represented parties in the Business and Property Courts in London, as the first stage in eventually extending this as the mandatory method for all civil proceedings, it may be questioned for how long these constraints upon service upon solicitors by email will continue to serve a useful purpose, but any relaxation of them is of course a matter for the Civil Procedure Rule Committee.”

    The court clearly realises the expansion in technology and law that seems to make the Rules outdated and it appears that those not familiar with what some describe as the outdated legal world may be penalised – those people are inevitably Litigants in Person. In Barton, the claimant had already served via email, and so had the Rules allowed him to do so without permission from the other party, he would have served on time. The outdated Rules almost obstruct the court from adopting a more flexible approach and subsequently the court has almost gone full circle by tolerating less breaches for those litigating themselves. Perhaps it is no longer a question of the court’s discretion, but a necessity to update the CPR to reflect the changes in the way we are communicating with one another.

    If you have any questions in relation to this article, then please contact our commercial litigation solicitors.

  • Personal Guarantees

    Personal Guarantees

    Eldwick Law sets out guidance on what personal guarantees are and the grounds upon which you can challenge them.

    Personal guarantees and the law

    A personal guarantee is an agreement whereby an individual (the guarantor) agrees to satisfy the contractual obligations of another party, in the event that contracting party fails to do so. Generally the guarantee is given in favour of a creditor (such as a bank) and the contractual obligation is the repayment of a sum of money by a particular date.  For example, if an individual signs a personal guarantee on behalf of a business when taking out a loan, the individual is agreeing to become personally responsible for the financial obligations of the business to the bank, in the event the business fails to make its loan repayments.

    How far does a guarantor’s liability extend?

    The extent to which a guarantor is liable will either be limited to a certain amount or the entirety of an amount borrowed. However, even in circumstances where a guarantee is limited to a certain amount, a guarantor may be liable for enforcements costs and the interest on the outstanding debt, which is likely to accrue, over and above the principal amount.

    If the creditor calls upon the personal guarantee and the guarantor defaults, the creditor would be in a position to institute court proceedings for breach of contract or institute bankruptcy proceedings, thereby putting the guarantor’s personal assets at risk.

    Setting aside a personal guarantee

    There are several circumstances that can lead to a personal guarantee being set aside, which include:

    1. Duress

    Where a party’s consent to a contract is induced by duress, the contract is voidable by the aggrieved party. The threat can be actual or threatened violence or unlawful restraint to the person or to property; or it can be economic duress, such as a threat to terminate a contract. In order to prove economic duress, a party must demonstrate that the economic pressure being applied was illegitimate and that the party would not have entered into the contract but for the illegitimate economic pressure.

    1. Misrepresentation

    A party who has been a victim of misrepresentation (including an innocent misrepresentation) may rescind a contract, if that party was induced to enter into it by the statement made.  This remedy is usually only actionable where the other party to the contract has made the misrepresentation relied on.

    1. Undue Influence

    Undue influence applies when one party is able to exert influence over another, to the extent of preventing them from exercising independent judgment, and uses this influence to force them entering into a contract. The undue influence can be an actual (express) influence; and it can be an influence, which is presumed from the special relationship between the parties.

    1. Breach of Duty to Disclose

    Generally, the beneficiary of  personal guarantees is not under a duty to disclose material facts to the guarantor and the guarantor is under an obligation to inquire into and determine all the relevant facts. However, it has been established that a beneficiary under a guarantee may sometimes be under a duty to disclose unusual facts, not known, to a prospective guarantor and that if it fails to do so, the guarantee will be void.

    What do our solicitors say about personal guarantee laws and liabilities?

    Eager to secure funding, many individuals and especially new business owners, sign personal guarantees without fully understanding its implications and the real risk it may pose to their personal assets. It is imperative that, prior to signing a personal guarantee, you seek legal advice from an independent solicitor in order to ensure that you fully understand the legal ramifications.

    If a creditor is threatening to or has instituted legal proceedings against you based on personal guarantee, you should immediately seek legal advice. Proceedings such as those instituting bankruptcy proceedings are subject to strict time periods.

    Eldwick law has a team of experienced solicitors, who can assist at any stage, be it the provision of initial advice or assistance in bringing/defending legal proceedings.

  • Penalty Clauses, Primary & Secondary Obligation

    Penalty Clauses, Primary & Secondary Obligation

    Is it a penalty? It depends on its goal….

    Understanding penalty clauses in contracts is crucial for anyone involved in legal agreements or business dealings.

    In this article, we’ll delve into what a penalty clause is and why it’s significant in contract law, with a particular focus on the landmark 2016 case, Cavendish Square Holding BV v. Talal El Makdessi.

    This case reshaped the legal approach to penalty clauses, establishing new guidelines for when they can be enforced.

    We’ll discover the key aspects of this ruling and its implications for contracts. To bring this to life, we’ll also examine a real-world example from Eldwick Law, showcasing how these legal principles are applied in practice.

    This guide serves as a valuable resource for anyone looking to gain a clearer understanding of penalty clauses and their role in contracts.

    Contact Us

    What is a Penalty Clause?

    Broadly, a penalty clause is a contractual provision that levies an excessive monetary sum unrelated to the actual harm against a default party. They are generally unenforceable under English Law.

    What is the test for deciding whether a provision is a penalty clause?

    The landmark case of Cavendish Square Holding BV -v- Talal El Makdessi [2016] AC 1172 replaced the old test of whether a penalty clause was a “genuine pre-estimate of loss“. In Makdessi, Mr El-Makdessi agreed to sell his stake in a marketing company to the Claimant.

    The parties entered into a contract, which included certain restrictive covenants (requiring a party to either do or refrain from taking a specific action) that he would not engage in competing activities. If he did, then he would not be owed the final two instalments of the sale price and further, the Claimant could purchase his remaining shares within the business.

    Mr El-Makdessi breached the non-compete clause in the contract, but argued that the clauses were unenforceable as penalty clauses. However, the Supreme Court held that both clauses were primary obligations and therefore not subject to the penalty rule.

    What does it mean?

    Lords Neuberger and Sumption (with whom Lords Clarke and Carnwath agreed) gave the leading judgment restating the penalty rule. A contractual provision is penal if, as a matter of construction:

    1. It is a secondary obligation; and
    1. It seeks to impose a detriment on the defaulting party, which is out of proportion to any legitimate interest of the innocent party in the performance of the primary obligation.

    Primary Obligation vs Secondary Obligation

    A primary obligation is essentially an obligation that has been imposed on both parties to carry out whatever they have promised to do, whereas a secondary obligation, would set out what the penalty is in the event of a breach of contract.

    As to what may constitute a “legitimate interest”, Lords Neuberger and Sumption said the following:

    “The innocent party can have no proper interest in simply punishing the defaulter. His interest is in performance or in some appropriate alternative to performance. In the case of a straightforward damages clause, that interest will rarely extend beyond compensation for the breach, and we therefore expect that Lord Dunedin’s four tests would usually be perfectly adequate to determine its validity. But compensation is not necessarily the only legitimate interest that the innocent party may have in the performance of the defaulter’s primary obligations.”

    In his judgment, Lord Hodge also noted that where the primary obligation which has been breached is to pay money on a specific date, the innocent party’s interests are normally fully served by the payment of the specified sum together with interest and the costs of recovery.

    Penalty Clause Case Study

    We recently acted for a client who had been ordered to pay the entire sum due under a settlement agreement.

    His liability under the settlement agreement represented approximately 5% of the total settlement sum, but he was jointly and severally liable. Accordingly, when he failed to make payment, the creditor successfully obtained a judgment ordering our client to pay the entire sum due under the settlement agreement, less any payment he had already made.

    In practical terms, this meant that he became liable for a sum almost 10 times that he was originally liable to pay. We appealed, arguing that this was a penalty clause as it imposed a secondary obligation upon our client.
    We obtained permission, but shortly before the hearing, we settled on favourable terms.

    These examples highlight why it is important you understand each provision when entering into contracts, what could be classed as a primary or secondary obligation, and the remedies available to either the innocent party or defaulting party in the event of a breach, especially if there is unequal bargaining power between the parties.

    Our commercial litigation team at Eldwick Law have the expertise in drafting and advising on contracts and can assist you in the event of a dispute.

    Contact Us

  • Guidance from the CMA on Cartel Investigations

    Guidance from the CMA on Cartel Investigations

    The Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) recently published a blog with their guidance on cartel investigations entitled, How the CMA investigates cartels. This explains what the CMA frequently does as part of its evidence-gathering process, including, for example, undertaking covert surveillance, or executing dawn raids. This is a good read for solicitors and other practitioners undertaking work in this area, as well as businesses at risk of such regulatory interventions and criminal investigations.

    The CMA has set out details of how cartel investigations commence, for example, from organic intelligence-gathering and tip-offs to self-reporting. They outline their powers, including with regard to dawn raids, interviews, and compelling organisations to produce information. The CMA then go on to outline the process of setting out a “Statement of Objections” – that is, the CMA’s initial findings from their cartel investigation. Subjects have an opportunity to reply to this. The matter may then proceed to a final, published CMA decision.

    Where criminal sanctions are being entertained, the CMA will also carry out an assessment on whether there are sufficient grounds for individuals or businesses to be charged and prosecuted in the criminal courts.

    The CMA also outline the exercising of their discretion in applying to the Court for the directors of companies guilty of cartel behaviour to be disqualified from acting as company directors (for up to 15 years).

    All in all, worth a read!

    Abbas Nawrozzadeh is the Head of Regulatory and White Collar Crime at Eldwick Law. If you and/or your business are being investigated by the CMA or require expert advice, then please do not hesitate to email an@eldwicklaw.com and/or telephone 0207 887 6525.

  • Case Study: Energie Direct Franchising Limited v Star Gym Limited

    Case Study: Energie Direct Franchising Limited v Star Gym Limited

    Case Background

    The background to the claim is that the Defendant, Mr Nabi (a franchisee of Energie) was unhappy with the service being provided by energie Fit4Less, in particular their in-house software system called “Elan”. Mr Nabi was a vocal critic within the Energie franchisee network and felt that he was being bullied and intimated by Energie’s chief executive Mr Jan Spaticchia for voicing his concerns.

    There was then a significant deterioration in the relationship between Mr Spaticchia and Mr Nabi. Energie eventually terminated their Franchise Agreement with Mr Nabi on 28 April 2017. Under clause 25.3 of that Franchise Agreement, Energie exercised its option to take over the lease of the club, to purchase its assets including fitness equipment and to have assigned or novated to it any other contracts.

    Energie appointed three surveyors to provide opinions on the open market value of the lease. All three surveyors opined that the lease had little value and produced an “average-of-averages figure of £8,344” which was offered to Mr Nabi as the value of the lease. Mr Nabi rejected the valuations on the basis that Energie’s valuers were biased and the valuations were therefore not independent. This then led to a period where Mr Nabi continued to operate the club, even though the Franchise Agreement had been terminated (the “Interim Arrangement”). During the Interim Arrangement, Energie unilaterally ceased making payments received by Star Gym’s members, “purportedly so that it could if and when necessary pay for the Club’s staff, members and landlord.” After several months of negotiations, whilst Energie continued to withhold Mr Nabi’s payments, the club was closed down and Mr Nabi “flipped the signs” and handed the club to a company called HRPMoon Limited, of which Mr Nabi’s wife was the sole director.

    Energie Fit4Less brought a claim for breach of the Franchise Agreement, breach of confidence, procuring breaches of contract and unlawful means conspiracy. They also sought an injunction for specific performance, springboard injunctions against HRPMoon Limited, delivery up of confidential data, database, contact details and unquantified damages.

    Mr Murray Rosen QC (sitting as a Judge in the High Court) heard evidence from Mr Nabi, Mr Spattichia, Mr Simon Horner of GCW Retail Property Consultants (Energie’s appointed surveyor), Mr David Waugh of Elan (and Energie’s Systems and Technology Director) and other Energie representatives.

    The Judge’s Comments

    “I am bound to record that neither Mr Spaticchia nor Mr Horner impressed me as reliable witnesses, especially in attempting to minimise the relationship between Energie and GCW and explain Mr Horner’s role.”

    “Mr Spaticchia also seemed to me readily prepared to assume and hypothesise, if not invent, to make up for gaps in his recollection. I do not accept that he had a sufficient grasp of the details of his dealings with the Defendants to gainsay the documentary evidence and obvious inferences therefrom.

    As for Mr Nabi, whilst many aspects of his evidence seemed consistent with the documents or otherwise plausible – especially as regards the attempts to dominate the Defendants as franchisees by Energie – his account of how HRPMoon came to operate the Club – under his wife’s independent initiative, and with “accidental” access to the Member Information on his laptop – was incredible. This necessarily cast doubt over other controversial aspects of his testimony.”

    After a trial of 7 days, Mr Rosen QC dismissed Energie’s claims for specific performance and for damages (save as to nominal damages).

  • Is the UK Going to Finally Legalise Cannabis?

    Is the UK Going to Finally Legalise Cannabis?

    Eldwick Law’s commercial solicitors comment on the legalisation of cannabis.

    Cannabis in the form of Cannabidiol, also known as CBD has become legalised since 1 November 2018 in the UK. The turning point that outraged the public and commanded change (more…)