Category: Blog

Our opinions on recent trends and the latest legal news

  • Furlough Fraud – Eldwick Law Fraud Solicitors

    Furlough Fraud – Eldwick Law Fraud Solicitors

    What is the furlough scheme?

    On 20 April 2020, the government introduced the ‘Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme’ (CJRS). This is commonly referred to as the ‘Furlough Scheme’. A furlough is defined as a ‘temporary leave of absence’ from work. Whilst this scheme is ultimately helping struggling businesses and individuals, there is scope for abuse of the system, also known as ‘furlough fraud’. It is important for individuals and businesses to understand the implications of the scheme and take steps to prevent fraud.

    The Chancellor took the unprecedented move of offering government assistance to all employers, operating on a PAYE scheme, who otherwise would not be able to pay their staff. To prevent redundancies, the government offered support by subsidising 80% of their wages. From 1 August 2020, the government will start to slowly withdraw their support. They will first require employers to meet National Insurance and pension contributions in August. Throughout September and October, the percentage of contribution to employees’ wages will subside. The scheme ends on 31st October 2020.

    Under the scheme employees are not allowed to undertake any work at all for their employer. This excludes training, for any hours that their employers claim furlough assistance from the government for.

    The CJRS has been hailed as a lifesaving measure to prevent mass unemployment and to support the ‘stay-at-home’ orders that were necessary to contain the pandemic. However, as the total cost of the scheme has swelled to £28.7bn in 12 July 2020, the obvious question becomes how the Treasury is going to be able to recoup on this unprecedented public investment.

    Furlough fraud

    In a powerful statement of intent, HMRC arrested a 57-year old man from Solihull for allegedly defrauding the CJRS of £495,000. The man had his bank accounts frozen and is alleged to be part of a wider multi-million-pound tax fraud. He is one of eight men from the West Midlands area to have been arrested as part of the investigation. Whilst the HMRC were forced to suspend its investigatory activities in April due to capacity issues, the department is back with a vengeance to clamp down on any instances of fraud.

    HMRC reported over 1,900 complaints in May alone. These were arising from alleged mis-use of the CJRS scheme. Employers were claiming government support for furloughed workers while still requiring those workers to come to work. This is a clear abuse of process. However, given the raft of Coronavirus assistance packages that have been on offer for employees, self-employed workers and small businesses , the lines are easily blurred. It can be easier than people think to essentially ‘double-claim’ on government assistance.

    HMRC have set out additional safeguards to prevent fraudulent activity within the scheme which include:

    • Proof that the employee was on the payroll from 28 February 2020, in order to prevent the creation of fake employees
    • The requirement for an employer to have already been authenticated by HMRC.
    • A four- to six-day processing period to make background checks, which should flag high-risk claims.
    • Checks made after payout to verify a claim was real.
    • A whistleblowing facility so that abuse can be reported.

    The Finance Bill 2020

    HMRC has indicated the new Finance Bill will offer a 90-day grace period. This will allow employers to refer themselves to the authorities. You can refer yourself if you believe you have benefitted too much from the CJRS and voluntarily submit yourself to a reassessment. HMRC will pursue enforcement proceedings all the way to criminal sanction for those deliberately attempting to defraud the scheme. They will show leniency in cases where over-benefitting from the scheme was not intentional and take a co-operative approach to employers who have sums that they might need to repay.

    If you are an employer benefitting from the furlough scheme, it is important to ensure you have complied with your relevant obligations. It is imperative to ensure you have read the relevant guidance, properly trained HR and payroll staff in the scheme and updated your policies and procedures.

    Eldwick Law has specialist practitioners able to give tailored advice to businesses of all sizes.

  • Franchise Disputes and Your Rights

    Franchise Disputes and Your Rights

    Our Franchise Solicitors outline your rights and advise on areas of your franchise taking advantage of the vast experience in commercial law and a variety of other legal areas that could impact your business.

    We provide you with practical and commercial advice in order to help you reach a resolution, whilst offering support from our forensic and accountancy experts.

    Should you have any queries with regard to this article or your specific situation, get in touch with our franchise solicitors.

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    An overview of franchise disputes and your rights

    Franchise disputes are far from uncommon and have recently been making headlines: the pizza chain, Dominos’, ongoing dispute in the UK with its franchisees over profit sharing, which in turn is affecting its ability to expand into other European territories, or even when hundreds of KFC branches ran out of chicken in 2018 resulting in a substantial loss of earnings for both the franchisor and its franchisees.

    Whether you are a franchisee or franchisor of a small national or large international business, it is important you know what your rights are in order to protect you/your business from any potential claim(s) that could follow.

    As there is no legislation in the UK that specifically regulates franchising (although there is a self-regulating body – the British Franchise Association), it is crucial that you understand the provisions set out in the Franchise Agreement and in the event of a dispute, approach experienced franchise litigation solicitors, as these types of claims can often become complicated and involve different areas of law, such as: intellectual property, contract, and insolvency.

    The Franchise Agreement

    The Franchise Agreement will govern the relationship between the parties. It will dictate the parties’ obligations to one another, and in most cases, is weighted heavily in favour of the franchisor.

    The Franchise Agreement will often stipulate the terms or process to be followed in the event of a dispute, such as mediation or arbitration. However, we understand that parties cannot always reach a settlement through Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) and you may therefore have no choice but to consider litigation.

    In the event of a breach, what remedies are available?

    Within contracts, terms can be classified as a condition, warranty, or innominate term. It is important to know the distinction between each as it will affect the remedy available to the non-defaulting party (i.e. the innocent party) for breach of contract. So, what do these terms mean?

    A condition goes to the “root” of the contract. If breached, then it gives the non-defaulting party the right to either affirm the contract (continue the relationship under the contract) or terminate the contract by way of a repudiatory breach.

    A repudiatory breach is a breach in a contractual relationship that is so serious, that it would entitle the non-defaulting party to the agreement to terminate it and that party would then be released from the terms of the contract. However, it is crucial that you are certain of your position, as there are associated risks if you get it wrong. A warranty on the other hand only entitles the non-defaulting party to claim damages, not to terminate the contract.

    An innominate term is somewhere in the middle. The non-defaulting party can terminate the agreement if a breach of that term is “sufficiently serious.” The test that is often applied is from the case of Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd and is whether the non-defaulting party is deprived of “substantially the whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract that it should obtain.” The remedies available will depend on whether it is held the breach substantially deprived the non-defaulting party of the whole benefit of the contract or not.

    If it is, then the remedy available would entitle that party to terminate or affirm the contract and claim damages. However, if not, then the remedy available would be for damages only.

    Breach and termination of your franchise agreement

    If you consider there has been a breach of the Franchise Agreement, can you terminate?

    Yes, firstly depending on what clause(s) has been breached and whether it is deemed to be a condition or innominate term.

    Secondly, the Franchise Agreement itself will normally have a detailed provision dealing with termination and what the parties are required to do, such as providing notice within a stipulated time frame and in a specific format for example.

    If there is a mistake in the way this is done then the party in breach could avoid liability on the basis of a technicality, so it is key that you obtain legal advice before considering terminating your Franchise Agreement. Thirdly, you should also seek advice on your rights and obligations in the event a franchisee has given a personal guarantee.

    What should you do in the event your business is failing or you cannot reach a resolution amongst yourselves? As each individual case will depend on the facts, you should seek legal advice immediately to avoid causing any further detriment to your business or prejudicing your position. At Eldwick Law, our franchise solicitors can assist you whether in ADR or from the pre-action stage through to the conclusion at trial.

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  • Does an Email Constitute a Legally Binding Contract?

    Does an Email Constitute a Legally Binding Contract?

    The recent case of Athena Brands Ltd v Superdrug Stores Plc [2019] EWHC 3505, highlights employee’s liability when negotiating a contract on behalf of their employer via email.

    For a legally binding contract to be formed, an offer, acceptance of that offer and consideration is required. There must also be certainty regarding the key terms of the agreement, and there must be intention by both parties to create legal relations.

    Where an employee (agent) seeks to contract with a third party on behalf of their employer (principle), the employee must have principle authority to do so. This requires an agreement between the agent and principle, for the agent to act on the principal’s behalf. This authority can be express or implied.

    Is an email legally binding?

    In Athena Brands Ltd v Superdrug Stores Plc [2019] EWHC 3503, an email exchange took place between a Superdrug Stores buyer and Athena Brands, a manufacturer, regarding the sale of a new cosmetic product.

    The exchange of emails set out that the product would be sold to the Defendant at a set price during a 12-month period, in which the Defendant could order consignments of stock at any time via purchase orders. The sale price would have exceeded £1.3m, but in response to slower than expected sales – Superdrug stopped placing orders. The manufacturer claimed nearly £980,000 in damages.

    The Claimant alleged that the agreement also included a commitment by the Defendant to purchase a minimum amount of £1.3m of stock during this period, which the Defendant disputed on the basis that they were not committed to purchasing any products unless and until it submitted a specific purchase order.

    The Defendant alleged that there was nothing in Superdrug’s standard terms and conditions of purchase to indicate that they would agree terms for purchasing minimum quantities or would be bound by any such terms if an employee agreed them.

    The email containing the proposed terms was sent by the Claimant’s employee to the Buyer at the Defendant on 23 May 2017 and said:

    “Just to confirm, you are placing orders and committing to the yearly quantity against all lines detailed below…. We have agreed that you will call off stock… on an ad hoc basis within a 12-month period…. [there followed a table of products with quantities and prices] If you could drop me a note to confirm all the above ASAP that would be great, I shall then be in a position to push the button at this end.”

    The Buyer replied on 25 May 2017, stating:

    “Please go ahead with the below [referring to the claimant’s previous email and preceding chain], happy on Nature’s Alchemist…”

    The High Court found that there was a clear acceptance of Superdrug’s commitment to buying annual quantities of the product from the manufacturer. The Court ruled that nothing in Superdrug’s evidence showed that the claimant was unreasonable when it relied on the Defendant’s confirmation as binding the company.

    The Defendant’s failure to make the claimant aware of Superdrug’s policies which governed the negotiation of purchase contracts was particularly relevant to the Court’s ruling. It was found, had they done so, the outcome would likely have been different.

    Despite the fact the contract was agreed via an email exchange, it was found to be sufficiently clear to create a liability of £1.3m on the part of the Defendant. This highlights the dangers that businesses face when discussing contract terms in any sort of written form and that a legally binding contract contains a number of components that the court will assess objectively to determine validity.

    This case also serves as a reminder for employers to make clear to employees their responsibilities when acting on their employer’s behalf and the risks of failing to do so.

    At Eldwick Law, we have an expert team of contract lawyers who can assist with your claim.

    Should you have any queries with regard to this article, please do not hesitate to contact us via email: mail@eldwicklaw.com, or telephone: +44(0)203 972 8469.

     

  • Reflective Loss: A Clarification by the Supreme Court

    Reflective Loss: A Clarification by the Supreme Court

    On the 15th July 2020 the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in the case of Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31. In this case the court grappled with the history and development of the ‘Reflective Loss’ principle and was tasked with clarifying the width of its applicability.

    Facts of the Case

    The original case was brought by an investment company, Marex Financial Ltd (‘Marex’). This was against Mr Sevilleja, the owner and controller of two companies incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. Marex had obtained judgment against the two companies, which were vehicles through which Mr Sevilleja conducted foreign exchange trading. Mr Sevilleja was accused of moving the two companies’ assets out of the jurisdiction, into accounts under his personal control. This was done in such a way as to deprive Marex of being able to enforce the judgment. Marex issued against Mr Sevilleja personally for the judgment sums, interest and costs of pursuing him. Mr Sevilleja resisted their action, contending that Marex could sue him for the losses incurred to the BVI companies, which have been placed in voluntary insolvent liquidation and relied on ‘Reflective Loss’.

    What is Reflective Loss?

    The principle has emerged from a line of cases spawned from the ancient judgment in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. In that case it was decided that the only person who can seek relief for an injury done to a company, where the company has a cause of action, is the company itself.

    This case was followed by that of Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 which applied the principle in a modern context. It was held that in a situation where a company suffers loss, which in turn affects the value of shares held by a shareholder, the principle in Foss applies to prevent the company and its shareholders both suing for the loss. Only one of those two claims can proceed and Foss makes clear that it is the company that should be preferred.

    It is at this point that the Lord Reed, in the present case before the Supreme Court, determined that things went wrong. The court in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 made several determinations that purported to follow Prudential but, in the view of Lord Reed, misinterpreted the core of that judgment. It was held by Lord Millet in Johnson that the basis of the decision in Prudential was a desire by the court to avoid double recovery. This led to a focus, by the benches that followed, on avoiding circumstances whereby anyone connected to a company, that had a right of action in a dispute, could recover for their loss – even in circumstances where the company chose to do nothing about their right of action. The latter circumstance was justified with reference to a secondary desire expounded by Lord Millet to preserve company autonomy. It was held in Johnson that a company’s refusal to prosecute its right of action in such a way as to compensate its creditors or shareholders was, in a sense, a novus actus. It wasn’t the original defendant who had resulted in the shareholder/creditor not being able to recover their losses by remedying the original wrong done to the company, but the company itself.

    How was Johnson Wrongly Decided?

    Lord Reed was respectfully critical of Lord Millet’s interpretation of the reasoning in Prudential and concluded that he had departed too far from the very limited scope that Prudential was intended to have. Lord Reed determined that there were two fundamental assertions that gave rise to Lord Millet’s misadventure. The first being a misjudgement of what shareholding in a company actually represents. He described a share as representing “a proportionate part of the company’s net assets” and that “if these are depleted the diminution in its assets will be reflected in the diminution in the value of the shares”. Lord Reed disagreed, instead concluding that shares are simply “a right of participation in the company on the terms of the articles of association”. He goes on to highlight that it is an “unrealistic assumption that there is a universal and necessary relationship between changes in a company’s net assets and changes in its share value”. Lord Reed also determined that to view Prudential, and therefore Foss, through the lens of ‘double-recovery’ was to mischaracterise the nature of legal loss. By linking the value of the loss to the company intrinsically to the value of the shares, Lord Millet is conceding that the shareholder has suffered a legal loss – albeit one that he then denies them recovery for. Lord Reed concludes that this is a perversion of Foss and entirely not what Prudential intended. He concluded that those two cases, when read together, in fact do not recognise the reduction in value of a company’s shares (as a result of a wrong done to it) as being a legal loss at all.

    Lord Reed, in support of his conclusion, highlighted the principal logical inconsistency with the fact that Lord Millet’s approach to Reflective Loss was based upon avoiding ‘double-recovery’ but led to situations where neither the company nor its shareholders had recovered for an actionable loss.

    Conclusion

    Lord Reed concluded in Sevilleja that “the critical point is that the shareholder has not suffered a loss which is regarded by the law as being separate and distinct from the company’s loss, and therefore has no claim to recover it.” This is contrasted against creditors or employees, who may have other rights of action that arise separately from any shareholding, and does not prejudice those parties from pursuing their cases, as the law would otherwise allow. Thus it can be said that the rule on ‘Reflective Loss’ has been narrowed to account for what Lord Reed would suggest was a wrong-turn at Johnson that opened the door to the principle from Foss being more widely interpreted than the judgment in Prudential intended.

    It is important that those wishing to invoke the exception to the rule against reflective loss carefully explore whether claims can be brought by the company, rather than shareholders or creditors. It is crucial that legal advice is obtained early on to clarify the claimants position. At Eldwick Law, we are experts in commercial law. Contact our commercial lawyers today for a consultation.

  • Breach of Planning Enforcement Notices and Confiscation

    Breach of Planning Enforcement Notices and Confiscation

    The recent case of R (Kombou) v Wood Green Crown Court is a sobering lesson for anyone facing a criminal prosecution, and who is considering pleading guilty with potential Confiscation proceedings looming.

    Case background

    The defendant entered guilty pleas at the Magistrates’ Court to breaches of a Local Authority (Enfield Council) planning enforcement notice. The offences related to unauthorised conversion of a house into 8 separate units.

    The defendant sought to change his plea when the matter was committed to the Crown Court and the Local Authority pursued Confiscation proceedings. He applied to vacate his guilty plea but the Crown Court refused his application.

    The defendant challenged, by way of Judicial Review, the Crown Court’s decision to refuse permission to vacate his guilty plea. The defendant argued that the Local Authority was improperly motivated because of the benefit which they would derive from the Home Office’s Asset Recover Incentivisation Scheme (“ARIS”).

    The High Court rejected his challenge, finding that the fact that the Local Authority had considered bringing confiscation proceedings did not mean the decision to prosecute had been motivated by an improper consideration; there was nothing to support the argument that the decision to prosecute was improperly motivated.

    There is some background to the case but one of the reasons the defendant pleaded guilty was because he thought it was possible that the case might end without Confiscation proceedings.

    Local Authorities are increasingly relying on planning enforcement notices to prosecute and recover any ‘ill gotten gains’. Local Authorities will receive 37.5% of the money recovered – it’s big business, and so one may naturally be critical of the motivations to prosecute here. The Court concluded that there were no improper motivations in this case, however.

    How can we help?

    If you are facing a Local Authority investigation or prosecution, it’s important to get early advice from an experienced team of lawyers. Early representation can make all the difference.

  • Unexplained Wealth Orders: Justified Seizure?

    Unexplained Wealth Orders: Justified Seizure?

    Unexplained Wealth Orders (“UWO”) are posing an increasing threat to the assets of private individuals. At a moment’s notice, authorities such as the HMRC and CPS can seize assets where they suspect the property is criminal property. The economy has taken a significant knock and all of the signs suggest authorities such as the HMRC are looking to UWO rather than proceed by way of a criminal prosecution.

    Put simply, a UWO requires the responding party to explain what interest they have in whatever property is named in the order, how they obtained the property, and how it is held.

    Applications for such orders can be made without notice to the High Court by enforcement authorities including the Serious Fraud Office, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, and the National Crime Agency. Applicants must:

    1. Specify or describe the property in respect of which the order is sought; and

    2. Specify the person who they believe holds the property.

    The threshold tests for obtaining an order are relatively low. Before deciding whether to issue a UWO, the court needs to be satisfied of the following:

    1. That there is reasonable cause to believe the respondent holds the property;

    2. That the value of the property is greater than £50,000;

    3. That there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the known sources of the respondent’s lawfully obtained income would have been insufficient to enable the respondent to obtain the property;

    Thereafter, for most applications, the court will be asked to consider there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person affected by the order or a person connected with that person is or has been involved in serious crime (whether in the UK or elsewhere).

    Many commentators discussing UWO focus on people suspected to have suspicious political connections or “politically exposed persons” (PEP). It is important to stress, UWO have an impact well beyond PEP and can affect any individual.

    If the individual does not provide satisfactory evidence of how their assets were acquired, these assets can be held as ‘recoverable property’ for the purposes of a civil recovery order under the Proceeds of Crime Act.

    The order may also be accompanied by an interim freezing order, as an unexplained wealth order alone will only lead to investigation, rather than the assets being frozen or seized. This is typically imposed to prevent any assets being disposed of before the unexplained wealth order process is complete. However, this could lead to a number of innocent people fighting to retain their assets on the basis of an assumption of fraud.

    In National Crime Agency v Baker and ors [2020] EWHC 822 (Admin), the High Court discharged three unexplained wealth orders brought against two high profile Kazakhstan individuals relating to three London properties worth over £80m. In this case, following a detailed examination of the evidence, the court found the source of ownership of the properties were no longer unexplained. In this case, all properties were subject to freezing orders whilst the unexplained wealth order process was being carried out.

    Whilst it is a complex task for agencies to prove how individuals obtained their wealth and identify ownership of assets, especially overseas, it seems that unexplained wealth orders are being used as an alternative to impair the individual in question, as it would be onerous to arrest and charge the individual with a criminal offence based on investigative purposes.

    Further, this type of order places the burden on the individual, rather than the enforcement agency to evidence the source of the wealth. The threshold for an obtaining an order is relatively low as the civil standard of proof applies, making it easy for agencies to pursue anyone they believe worth investigating. The authorities only have to be satisfied that the evidence is strong enough on the balance of probabilities that there has been a serious criminal act.

    In Baker, the Court emphasised the relatively limited purpose of UWOs as an investigative tool as once property and asset ownership has been explained, the purpose of the order falls away. The nature of an unexplained order seems draconian and unnecessary, especially as it places such as unfair burden on the individual. It seems these orders are being used as an alternative for bringing criminal charges, making it wholly unfair on the individual. The individual in question must prove the burden themselves and undergo an investigation, whilst their assets are likely to be frozen and tried without a jury. This seems wholly unfair and a cause for change regarding the nature of unexplained wealth orders, due to their detrimental effect on those who could be innocent individuals.

    Being investigated can be extremely daunting and as the threshold for investigation is low, it is crucial that you obtain the right legal guidance as early as possible. Eldwick Law have a team of lawyers who are experts in this area of law and can assist you with your case, no matter how big or small.

  • The Impact of COVID-19 on Commercial Contracts

    The Impact of COVID-19 on Commercial Contracts

    COVID-19 has changed the scope of business contracts in a variety of ways including the performance of contractual obligations. It is important for businesses to recognise their legal standing and the contractual issues they may be facing in light of coronavirus, so that they are not exposed to a claim for damages.

    Whether a party can suspend or terminate a contract due to the current climate will depend on a number of factors and the specific circumstances of the contractual terms in question.

    Force Majeure

    Unforeseen circumstance clauses contained within contracts are often expressly referred to in force majeure clauses in contracts. A force majeure clause will typically allow parties to renegotiate, extend, suspend and/or terminate the performance of the contract when an unforeseen or unexpected event has occurred. Force majeure is not a doctrine of English common law, meaning it is not implied in a contract. Therefore, parties wishing to rely on this clause must expressly insert a force majeure clause into a contract to rely upon it. Parties will often insert a force majeure clause to allocate risk between them when negotiating the drafting of a contract. Unexpected global events, such as the Coronavirus pandemic has the obvious ability to significantly disrupt the performance of a contract and is an example of where some force majeure clauses would be scrutinised quite carefully for who ultimately bears the loss.

    Is COVID-19 a force majeure event?

    Force majeure clauses must be specific, as the consequences of an unexpected event will be determined by the interpretation of the clause by the courts. The clauses will be examined in great detail to determine whether they can be taken to cover the intervening event and to ascertain whether the event is materially relevant to the performance of the contractual obligations in question. Whether a force majeure clause has been triggered in a contract will depend entirely on the exact wording that the parties have used, this often includes a non-exhaustive list of events. For example the presence of words such as: “pandemic”, “epidemic”, “outbreak”, “government action”, or “crisis” will be crucial in parties being able to argue that their force majeure clauses apply to the current circumstances.

    It is the duty of the party seeking to rely on the clause to prove that the force majeure event has significantly prevented or delayed them from performing their contractual duties. Classic Maritime Inc v Limbungan Makmur [2019] EWCA Civ 1102 suggests that the party looking to rely on a force majeure clause must have been willing and ready to perform the contract, even if the exceptional event had not occurred. The unexpected event must be the cause of the failure to perform the contract, rather than an excuse if the underlying problem is something else. Therefore, to give a current example, it isn’t enough that COVID-19 was around at the same time as the breach of contract, it has to be the cause of the breach.

    The English courts have previously not looked particularly favourably on reliance of force majeure clauses. However, the current climate makes it more likely than ever that parties will try to rely on force majeure clauses; due to the vast economic impact the pandemic is having on society and in turn, the impact it will have on the ability to perform contractual obligations. The Courts will not offer general guidance for this particular area of law, rather they will consider the cases on their individual merits.

    What if the contract does not include a force majeure clause?

    If force majeure is not a clause defined within a contract, parties may try to rely on specified time periods, which could warrant automatic termination. Parties will often scour their contracts for any clauses which provide flexibility, such as an option for the parties to terminate or renegotiate the contract, or any redress clauses. These clauses would need to be specifically drafted within the contract for them to take effect.

    Further, if a force majeure clause cannot be invoked, parties may seek to rely on the frustration of a contract to bring the contract to an end. A contract can be frustrated when something occurs after the formation of a contract, rendering it impossible to fulfil. Similar to force majeure, the burden of proof for frustration is on the person seeking to assert it. COVID-19 may possibly be a factor that parties can rely on when considering if their commercial contract has been frustrated, however this will heavily depend on the circumstances and wording of the individual contract and will often require parties taking detailed specialist advice.

    The realities of a global pandemic may require parties to be forced to re-negotiate aspects of a contract if the situation changes, since each contract is analysed on its own merits; however this would need to involve constructive communication between all parties involved and potentially the involvement of specialist providers of mediation services. It is important to understand the different legal and practical implications of that COVID-19 might have on current or future commercial contracts.

    Our commercial contract lawyers are experts in this field and can provide practical and specialist advice during this difficult time.

    Should you have any queries with regard to this article, please do not hesitate to contact us via email: mail@eldwicklaw.com, or telephone: +44(0)203 972 8469.

  • The Impact of COVID-19 on Litigation Proceedings

    The Impact of COVID-19 on Litigation Proceedings

    The unprecedented outbreak of COVID-19 has changed the way litigation proceedings operate in a number of ways. The recent changes include the closure of the Supreme Court, hearings being conducted remotely via video link, increased electronic pre-trial preparation, and many more procedural matters being dealt with on paper. Courts will be transferring to remote hearings where possible, which will give rise to significant change in working practices for everyone involved.

    Changes to the Civil Court system

    On 23 March 2020, the UK government issued instructions for everyone to stay at home, save for very limited purposes, as supported by the Coronavirus Act 2020 and related regulations. The Coronavirus Act makes a specific provision implying that the civil court should continue with remote hearings, with the aid of technology which has been supported by guidance subsequently produced by the senior judiciary.

    The new legislation will inevitably require a number of adjustments to be made to the civil courts as we know them, which will require co-operation and planning from the courts and the parties involved. Such planning will need to accommodate litigants and witnesses and ensure adequate video and audio quality so that all parties can be heard clearly and documents can be displayed visibly and quickly. While use of technology had already started to be applied and trialled across various courts in England & Wales, the current regime represents the most widespread use of technology in trials so far. Judges will have broad discretion as to how to proceed with cases and will make decisions on whether remote trials will be suitable on a case-by-case basis.

    Blackfriars Ltd [2020] EWHC 845 (Ch)

    The fact that a case may comprise significant sums, a lengthy trial time and multiple witnesses will not necessarily prevent the court deciding to hold the trial remotely. In One Blackfriars Ltd [2020] EWHC 845 (Ch), during a pre-trial review, the High Court rejected an application to adjourn the five-week hearing until June 2021. This trial is set to involve four live witnesses of fact and 13 expert witnesses. Placing importance on the overriding objective, John Kimbell QC rejected the submission that there was a real risk of unfairness in conducting a remote trial for this claim. It was held that the challenges and upsides of proceeding with a remote trial would apply to both sides equally. In this case, the court placed importance on the fact that there were no allegations of dishonesty or fraud and that the proceedings contained a large number of contemporaneous documents, where most of the relevant matters were likely to be set out.

    The trial judge acknowledged the health and safety risks posed by conducting the trial in-person and pointed out that it was not “a case in which it can be said that it is essential to have the witness, the cross-examiner and the judge and the other participants in the same physical space”. It is clear that the court are trying to strike a balance between protecting the health and safety of those involved in litigation and ensuring the course of justice will ensue, with a demonstrable focus on avoiding undue delay.

    Is it a just approach?

    It has been acknowledged by the courts that they do not have the technological capabilities to offer a full remote service, and have indicated that HMCTS are working urgently to expand the technology available. In the meantime, courts will conduct hearings via Skype, telephone and other available video facilities. One of the issues with this is that many participants may not have the technological knowledge for hearings to progress smoothly, which could cause delays, especially in the early months. Parties are encouraged to be cooperative, especially in cases involving litigants in person, to try and ensure some fairness during the process and the courts have indicated that they would take a more relaxed approach than usual to compliance with certain aspects of the Civil Procedure Rules. For example, if court proceedings were not received due to self-isolation restrictions or office closures a request for relief from sanctions for late service would be expected to be looked upon sympathetically. It is important for the courts and both parties to be flexible in this regard and prioritise cooperation between the parties to ensure justice is not obstructed for the sake of a tactical advantage over one party.

    Some would undoubtedly think, such as the parties involved in the Blackfriars Ltd [2020] matter, that it would be more practical to postpone hearings until normality is resumed. Whilst this may seem sensible for some cases, the majority of cases are financially sensitive and adjournments may cause hardship for those involved. This may be particularly distressing whilst we are in a time of financial turmoil due to the current circumstances and not something that one party should be allowed to take advantage of.

    Could this change the future of the courts?

    The rules in the civil courts are flexible enough to allow the processes to be adapted quickly to ensure that proceedings fall in line with new coronavirus legislation. Some have seen the step towards a new ‘virtual’ court as a blueprint for the future of modern justice, for certain proceedings that can be easily managed without the need of physical attendance by the parties. Virtual hearings are far less costly for both parties and may be more time efficient, for example if both parties have to undergo preparation beforehand to ensure that all of those involved have in their possession the correct documents. While it remains unlikely that procedures will remain so drastically changed once the pandemic subsides, this will at least offer the most widespread trial of digital services the English court system has ever seen and will undoubtedly offer a great many lessons to learn in the making of future reforms.  

    Cases are financially sensitive and adjournments may cause financial difficulty for those involved. This may be particularly distressing whilst we are in a time of financial hardship due to the current circumstances and not something that one party should be allowed to take advantage of.

    Could this change the future of the courts?

    The rules in the civil courts are flexible enough to allow the processes to be adapted quickly to ensure that proceedings fall in line with new coronavirus legislation. With many arguing that traditional courts are far behind in terms of their upkeep of the modern world, the step towards a new ‘virtual’ court may be the future for certain proceedings that can be easily managed without the need of physical presence. Once these hearings are being progressed without a hitch, it may become more sustainable to work this way going forward. Virtual hearings are far less costly for both parties and may be more time efficient, for example if both parties have to undergo preparation beforehand to ensure that all of those involved have in their possession the correct documents. Of course, it is unlikely that procedures will change so drastically once normality returns, however it may be the change the legislature needs as a step in the right direction towards a more modern court system.  

    Eldwick Law have a team of expert solicitors who are able to assist you with any litigation during these unprecedented times.

    COVID-19 advice and guidance

  • New UK Anti Money Laundering Regulations

    New UK Anti Money Laundering Regulations

    The new Money Laundering and Terrorist Finance Amendments Regulations 2019 (“The Regulations”) comes into effect from 10 January 2020 and will directly impact the art sector.

    It’s a surprising move on the part of the UK Government but, many would argue, overdue given the art sector has been long regarded as an ideal playground for money laundering activities.

    WHO DOES THIS AFFECT?

    Essentially, most people or organisations that deal in art – including, but not limited to:

    • Art dealers;
    • Auction houses;
    • Galleries;
    • Any firm or sole trader.

    SO, WHAT’S NEW?

    The European Union’s Fifth Money Laundering Directive (“5AMLD”) has now been implement in the form The Regulations and targets, amongst other sectors, “art market participants”.

    So, from 10 January 2020, the UK art market will be designated as a “regulated” market for compliance purposes.

    WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?

    In short, there will be a major overhaul in practices within the art market.

    Art market “participants”, which include owners and senior members, will now need to undertake proper checks on customers and take a “risk-based approach” to compliance. Previously, this only extended to those identified as “high value dealers”, but it now applies across the board.

    Art market participants who are establishing a business relationship or involved in a transaction (or linked series of transactions) worth €10,000 or more must now complete a process of “Client Due Diligence” (“CDD”) before business dealings or handling monies. These are similar checks that are carried out by banks, law firms etc, and includes the obtaining of documents such as photographic ID and proof of address.

    Of note is that the €10,000 threshold is not limited to payment type – it applies to any payments in cash, cheque, bank transfer or any other payment methods.

    Importantly, there is also a registration requirement: art participants will now need to register with HM Revenue & Customs (“HMRC”), the UK’s Supervising Authority, within one year.

    Further requirements include the need to appoint a Money Laundering Compliance Officer (“MLRO”) to supervise compliance, report suspicious activities, review staff compliance training and so forth.

    There is therefore a requirement to commit significant financial resources and time to ensuring compliance, and with the threat of potentially severe consequences for failures to comply  not least to one’s reputation.

    NON-COMPLIANCE

    Failure to comply can lead to fines or a prosecution against institutions, their directors and senior management – and so it is essential for any person or business to take immediate steps to ensure they do not fall foul!

    FURTHER GUIDANCE

    There is currently little in the way of industry guidance available, but The British Art Market Federation (“BAMF”) will be issuing guidance shortly – so watch this space.

    HOW CAN WE HELP?

    Establishing a compliance system to meet the obligations imposed by The Regulations may be daunting, so any affected person or entity is best advised to seek expert advice sooner rather than later – as with anything else, prevention is better than a cure.

    If you would like to discuss the implementation of an effective compliance programme or have been made subject of a regulatory/criminal investigation, we offer expert advice, assistance and representation.

    Should you have any queries with regard to this article, please do not hesitate to contact us via email: mail@eldwicklaw.com, or telephone: +44(0)203 972 8469.

    Abbas Nawrozzadeh is a Senior Solicitor specialising in Regulatory Law and White-Collar Crime at Eldwick Law.

  • Relief from Sanctions: is the CPR obstructing access to justice?

    Relief from Sanctions: is the CPR obstructing access to justice?

    Our Commercial Litigation solicitors comment on this ever changing and important area of litigation law: application for relief from sanctions.

    The 2013 Jackson reforms brought changes to the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) relating to, inter alia, applications for relief from sanctions; in essence, the courts were less tolerant of breaches of the Rules and unjustified delays. The court’s approach was then updated to allow Judges to have further discretion in applications for relief. However, despite the reforms, the court’s approach to Litigants in Person remains stringent. With the reduction in Legal Aid and Conditional Fee Agreements, there is an increase in the number of individuals acting without legal assistance. Whilst the court is required to treat both represented and unrepresented parties on a level playing field, should the court be more flexible with Litigants in Person?

    A stringent approach to application for relief from sanctions

    The court interpreted the test in Mitchell v Newsgroup Newspapers [2013] EWCA Civ 1537 and took a ‘no nonsense’ approach towards applications for relief from sanctions. In circumstances where the breach was ‘trivial’, the party seeking relief was usually granted relief provided that an application was made promptly. On the other hand, if the breach could not be characterised as ‘trivial’, then the burden is on the defaulting party to persuade the court to grant relief. Essentially, this case made it clear that if there was a very good reason for the breach or failure to comply, then relief will usually be granted. This sled to an increase in satellite litigation.

    A more flexible approach

    However, the Court of Appeal in Denton v TH White Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 906 considered Mitchell to be misunderstood and clarified the points made by adopting a more tempered three stage test for applications. The court also warned of the substantial costs that could be imposed on those parties who were unreasonably trying to take tactical advantage of an opponent’s breach and implemented further factors to consider. In Denton it was ruled that in every case, the court must consider all of the circumstances. The test requires:

    1. the court to identify and assess the seriousness and significance of the failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order;
    2. the court should consider why the default occurred;
    3. the court should evaluate all circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application.

    Therefore, if there is a serious or significant breach and there is no good reason for the breach, then an application for relief from sanctions will not automatically fail as it had done in the past. The courts no longer focus on the triviality of the breach, unless it is used to decide whether the breach was serious or significant.

    Litigants in person

    Despite Denton allowing the court further discretion, it took a strict line approach in Barton Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12. The Supreme Court held that Litigants in Person will not receive special consideration if they have failed to comply with the CPR.

    This case concerned the service of a professional negligence claim upon the defendant’s former solicitors. The claimant served his claim form by way of email, without checking whether the defendant would accept service in this way. When the claimant informed the defendant that he was effecting service, the firm refused to acknowledge service via email, despite the expiry of the limitation period the following day. The claimant’s application to extend service of the claim form was rejected at first instance and later in two appeals. Lord Sumption commented that whilst the status of a Litigant in Person permits a “lower standard of compliance with rules or orders of the court”, the claimant had still had a duty to follow the provisions of the CPR, and it failed to do so in this case.

    The Judge went on to comment that the Rules are available to lay persons online, and are therefore readily accessible to Litigants in Person. However, what makes this quite a contradictory approach is that on the one hand the court advocates the use of the internet for lay people to search for the Rules, yet the Rules themselves still allow firms to deny service via email. Email communication has become the most used communication methods between firms, their clients, and other businesses professionals. If a lay person is encouraged to search for these Rules online, then it should follow that the CPR be updated to allow service by email. The Business and Property courts themselves have introduced ‘legal tech’ such as CE file into their systems to allow for a smoother operation of the court process. In fact, Lord Briggs in his dissent of Barton stated:

    “Now that issue and filing is required to be carried out online, by legally represented parties in the Business and Property Courts in London, as the first stage in eventually extending this as the mandatory method for all civil proceedings, it may be questioned for how long these constraints upon service upon solicitors by email will continue to serve a useful purpose, but any relaxation of them is of course a matter for the Civil Procedure Rule Committee.”

    The court clearly realises the expansion in technology and law that seems to make the Rules outdated and it appears that those not familiar with what some describe as the outdated legal world may be penalised – those people are inevitably Litigants in Person. In Barton, the claimant had already served via email, and so had the Rules allowed him to do so without permission from the other party, he would have served on time. The outdated Rules almost obstruct the court from adopting a more flexible approach and subsequently the court has almost gone full circle by tolerating less breaches for those litigating themselves. Perhaps it is no longer a question of the court’s discretion, but a necessity to update the CPR to reflect the changes in the way we are communicating with one another.

    If you have any questions in relation to this article, then please contact our commercial litigation solicitors.