Category: Dispute Resolution

  • Drafting and Enforcement Jurisdiction Clauses in International Contracts

    Drafting and Enforcement Jurisdiction Clauses in International Contracts

    A jurisdiction clause is a contractual provision that specifies which court has authority to resolve disputes between the parties. In cross-border commerce, where multiple legal systems may claim a connection to a transaction, these clauses provide the certainty that commercial parties need. Without one, a party may find itself defending proceedings in an unexpected or hostile forum, facing unfamiliar procedural rules and high additional costs.​

    The risk of so-called “torpedo” litigation, where a party pre-emptively commences proceedings in a slow-moving court to frustrate the other side’s claims, makes careful drafting essential. The High Court of Justice and the Commercial Court in London enjoy a global reputation for judicial independence, procedural rigour, and expertise in complex commercial matters. For these reasons, parties to international contracts frequently choose England and Wales as their forum for dispute resolution.

    Types of jurisdiction clauses

    There are three principal forms of jurisdiction clause used in international commercial contracts, each with different consequences for enforcement.

    Exclusive jurisdiction clauses

    These require both parties to bring proceedings only in the courts of England and Wales. They provide maximum certainty and, critically, trigger the protections of the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. Under that Convention, contracting states must give effect to the parties’ chosen court and refuse jurisdiction where proceedings are brought elsewhere in breach of the agreement. In Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64, the House of Lords confirmed that where parties have bound themselves by an exclusive jurisdiction clause, effect should ordinarily be given to that obligation in the absence of strong reasons for departing from it.

    Non-exclusive jurisdiction clauses

    These allow one or both parties to bring proceedings in England and Wales, while preserving the right to commence proceedings in another competent court. They offer flexibility but, until recently, lacked a clear international enforcement framework following Brexit.

    Asymmetric (or unilateral) jurisdiction clauses

    These are common in finance transactions. They typically allow one party (usually a lender) to sue in any competent court while restricting the other to a specified jurisdiction. In Commerzbank AG v Liquimar Tankers Management Inc [2017] EWHC 161 (Comm), the English Commercial Court upheld the validity of an asymmetric clause and treated it as an exclusive jurisdiction agreement for the purposes of the Brussels Recast Regulation. Practitioners should be aware, however, that some civil law jurisdictions have historically viewed asymmetric clauses with scepticism. The French Cour de cassation in Mme X v Société Banque Privée Edmond de Rothschild (2012) appeared to decide that such clauses were ineffective. However, the CJEU subsequently upheld their validity in EU law.

    The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) uses what is, in substance, an asymmetric dispute resolution clause in its standard loan documentation. The EBRD’s model provisions typically require the borrower to submit to a specified dispute resolution mechanism, such as LCIA arbitration seated in London, whilst reserving to the EBRD (or its co-lenders) the right, at their election, to refer disputes instead to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales. The EBRD may also commence proceedings in any other court of competent jurisdiction and take concurrent proceedings in multiple jurisdictions. This structure, which mirrors the Loan Market Association (LMA) standard form, reflects the commercial reality of development finance: the lender requires maximum flexibility to enforce its rights wherever the borrower’s assets may be located, whilst the borrower accepts a single, predictable forum. Practitioners drafting jurisdiction clauses in EBRD-financed transactions should ensure that any asymmetric provisions are consistent across all finance documents, including intercreditor agreements and security documentation.

    Drafting best practices

    In my experience, precision in language is the single most important factor in drafting an effective jurisdiction clause. When I draft clauses, I ensure they refer to “the Courts of England and Wales” rather than vague formulations such as “UK Courts” or “a friendly jurisdiction.” This is important because the UK comprises three separate legal jurisdictions (England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland), and imprecise wording can create genuine ambiguity about which court system the parties intended.​

    I also ensure that the scope of the clause is broad enough to capture the full range of potential claims. A formulation such as “any dispute arising out of or in connection with this contract, including any question regarding its existence, validity, or termination” will cover both contractual and non-contractual claims, such as tortious or restitutionary claims arising from the same relationship.

    In addition, appointing a process agent in England is strongly advisable where one or more parties are domiciled abroad. Without a process agent, a claimant may face the expense and delay of seeking the court’s permission to serve proceedings overseas under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). Since April 2021, CPR 6.33(2B)(b) provides that permission is not required to serve a claim form out of the jurisdiction where jurisdiction is founded on any choice of court agreement in favour of the courts of England and Wales, but practical difficulties in effecting service abroad can still cause significant delay.

    Finally, all contractual terms relating to jurisdiction must be consistent. In multi-document transactions, conflicting jurisdiction terms in standard terms, purchase orders, or invoices can give rise to “battle of the forms” arguments. I ensure that any jurisdiction clauses are clearly identified and cross-referenced across all relevant documents.

    The enforcement framework post-Brexit

    The UK’s departure from the EU meant that the Brussels Recast Regulation and the Lugano Convention ceased to apply. This created uncertainty about how English judgments would be enforced in EU member states, and vice versa. The enforcement framework is now built on two international conventions and, where those do not apply, on common law rules.​

    The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements is the primary vehicle for enforcing English judgments in contracting states where the underlying contract contained an exclusive jurisdiction clause concluded after 1 January 2021. It requires the chosen court to exercise jurisdiction and obliges courts in other contracting states to refuse to hear the case and to recognise the resulting judgment.

    The Hague Judgments Convention 2019, which entered into force in the UK on 1 July 2025, closes a significant gap. It applies to judgments arising from proceedings commenced on or after that date, and its scope expressly includes non-exclusive and asymmetric jurisdiction clauses, while excluding exclusive clauses to avoid overlap with the 2005 Convention. The Convention has been implemented into UK law through amendments to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. As of early 2026, contracting states include the EU (except Denmark), Ukraine, Uruguay, Albania, and (from March 2026) Montenegro.

    Where neither Convention applies, enforcement of English judgments abroad depends on the domestic law of the relevant foreign state. In some jurisdictions, this process is relatively straightforward; in others, it can be protracted and uncertain. Therefore, I conduct an enforcement risk assessment at the drafting stage, considering where the opposing party’s assets are located and which enforcement routes will be available in those jurisdictions.

    Practical challenges and remedies

    When a party commences proceedings in a foreign court in breach of a jurisdiction clause, the English courts have the power to grant an anti-suit injunction under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. This is an order restraining a party from pursuing or continuing foreign proceedings. In The Angelic Grace [1995]1 Lloyd’s Rep 87, Lord Millett stated that there is “no good reason for diffidence in granting an injunction to restrain foreign proceedings on the clear and simple ground that the defendant has promised not to bring them.” Breach of an anti-suit injunction constitutes contempt of court and carries the risk of significant fines, asset freezes, or even imprisonment.

    The doctrine of forum non conveniens, as established in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd 1 AC 460, allows a court to stay proceedings if the defendant establishes that another forum is “clearly or distinctly more appropriate.” If the defendant discharges that burden, the claimant may still resist a stay by demonstrating a real risk of being unable to obtain substantial justice in the alternative forum. Where an exclusive jurisdiction clause is in place, however, the court will ordinarily give effect to the agreement unless the party seeking to depart from it can show “strong reasons” for doing so.

    The recent decision in Alimov v Mirakhmedov [2024] EWHC 3322 (Comm) illustrates the Spiliada principles in action. The dispute arose from an alleged oral agreement concerning a bitcoin mining joint venture in Kazakhstan. Although the claimant established a plausible case that the agreement was formed in London, the Commercial Court stayed the proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds, finding that Kazakhstan was “clearly and distinctly more appropriate” than England. The court emphasised that the claims were governed exclusively by Kazakh law, that the parties had substantial connections to Kazakhstan, that the location of the relevant events and assets was in Kazakhstan, and that the majority of witnesses and documents were in Russian or Kazakh. The claimant’s connections to England were found to be relatively slight and insufficient to outweigh Kazakhstan’s strong links to the dispute. The court also found no cogent evidence of a real risk of substantial injustice in the Kazakh courts. Alimov v Mirakhmedov reinforces the principle that a tenuous jurisdictional hook, such as the location of a single meeting, will not suffice where the overwhelming weight of connecting factors points to a foreign forum.

    English courts also provide a strategic advantage through interim relief. Freezing orders (Mareva injunctions) can prevent a party from dissipating assets before judgment, and disclosure orders can compel the provision of information about assets worldwide. These remedies can be obtained rapidly, often on a without-notice basis, and are available to support both English and foreign or arbitration proceedings.

    Action points for those entering into international contracts

    Parties entering into international contracts should treat the jurisdiction clause as a core commercial term. The following practical steps will help protect their position:

    • Take legal advice before signing any contract containing a jurisdiction or governing law clause, particularly where the counterparty’s standard terms may include a competing clause.
    • Review existing contracts to ensure jurisdiction clauses are enforceable under the current Hague Convention framework. Pre-2021 exclusive clauses that pre-date the UK’s accession to the 2005 Convention may face enforceability challenges in some EU member states.
    • Conduct an enforcement risk assessment at the outset: identify where the opposing party’s assets are located and confirm that an English judgment can be enforced there, either under a Convention or under local law.
    • Ensure consistency between the jurisdiction clause and the governing law clause. Specifying the courts of England and Wales but choosing a foreign governing law, or vice versa, can create unnecessary complexity.
    • Act quickly if proceedings are commenced abroad in breach of the clause. Delay weakens the prospects of obtaining an anti-suit injunction and may be treated as acquiescence.​

    The outlook for English jurisdiction clauses

    The entry into force of the 2019 Hague Judgments Convention has materially strengthened England’s position as a forum for international commercial disputes. The gap left by Brexit for non-exclusive and asymmetric clauses is now substantially closed, and the Convention’s membership is expected to grow. As courts in contracting states begin to apply the Convention, a body of case law will develop, providing further clarity on its practical operation.​

    England and Wales continue to offer a combination of qualities that few jurisdictions can match: an independent and expert judiciary, a mature body of commercial law, powerful interim remedies, and a well-resourced enforcement framework. Practitioners should ensure that every international contract contains a clearly drafted jurisdiction clause, paired with an express governing law clause. Those two provisions, working together, remain the most effective means of securing commercial certainty in cross-border transactions.

    Frequently asked questions

    What is the difference between an exclusive and a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause?

    An exclusive jurisdiction clause requires both parties to bring any dispute only before the specified courts. A non-exclusive clause gives one or both parties the right to sue in the specified courts, but does not prevent proceedings elsewhere. Exclusive clauses offer greater certainty and benefit from the enforcement regime under the 2005 Hague Convention.

    Are asymmetric jurisdiction clauses enforceable in England and Wales?

    Yes, the English courts have consistently upheld asymmetric clauses. In Commerzbank AG v Liquimar Tankers Management Inc EWHC 161 (Comm), the Commercial Court confirmed their validity. It gave them the protection of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement under the Brussels Recast Regulation. Some civil law jurisdictions have historically taken a different view, so practitioners should check the position in relevant foreign courts.

    How does the 2019 Hague Convention improve the enforcement of English judgments?

    The 2019 Convention, in force in the UK since 1 July 2025, provides a framework for the recognition and enforcement of judgments between contracting states that covers non-exclusive and asymmetric jurisdiction clauses. Previously, the 2005 Convention covered only exclusive clauses, leaving a significant gap following Brexit for other types of jurisdiction agreements.

    What can I do if the other party starts proceedings abroad in breach of our jurisdiction clause?

    An application for an anti-suit injunction from the English courts is the primary remedy. This will order the other party to cease or refrain from commencing the foreign proceedings. The application should be made promptly, as delay can be fatal. Breach of the injunction amounts to contempt of court.

    Should I always pair a jurisdiction clause with a governing law clause?

    Yes, a jurisdiction clause determines where disputes are heard, while a governing law clause determines which legal principles the court applies. Without an express governing law clause, the court will apply its own conflict-of-laws rules to determine the applicable law, which may yield an unexpected result. Including both clauses ensures the court applies the substantive law the parties intended.

    To discuss any points raised in this article, please call us on +44 (0) 203972 8469 or email us at mail@eldwicklaw.com.

    This article does not constitute legal advice. For further information, please don’t hesitate to get in touch with our London office.

  • Deadlock, Valuation and Director Misconduct Disputes

    Deadlock, Valuation and Director Misconduct Disputes

    1. Deadlock and stalemate disputes

    Deadlock happens when equal shareholders cannot agree on key decisions, paralysing business operations. Disputes can arise in relation to major decisions, such as whether to pursue expansion, hire key personnel, approve significant expenditure, or sell the business. Without a controlling shareholder, day-to-day operations grind to a halt as neither party can force through their preferred strategy. In 50:50 joint ventures, neither party commands the 75% majority required for special resolutions, creating gridlock that can destroy company value.

    Possible resolution mechanisms

    Shareholders agreements often anticipate deadlock and provide contractual mechanisms to break the impasse.

    • Casting vote provisions grant the chairman a pre-determined casting vote in tied decisions.
    • Independent arbitration allows the shareholders to appoint a neutral expert to resolve specific disputes.
    • Russian Roulette clauses enable one shareholder to offer to purchase the other’s shares at a set price, with the receiving shareholder able to reverse the transaction and buy the offering shareholder’s stake at the same per-share price, ensuring the offer is fair.
    • Texas Shootout involves sealed bids from both shareholders, with the highest bidder acquiring the company at that price.

    Where no contractual mechanism exists or both parties reject settlement, shareholders can petition for just and equitable winding up under section 122(1)(g) Insolvency Act 1986. The courts will dissolve a solvent company with deadlocked ownership, allowing an independent liquidator to distribute proceeds according to shareholding. However, courts treat winding up as a last resort and will refuse the petition if alternative remedies exist or the petitioner has acted unreasonably. Additionally, the petitioner must have held shares for at least 18 months.

    2. Breaches of shareholder agreement disputes

    Shareholders agreements set out the ground rules for how shares can be transferred, how voting decisions are made, and what happens when a shareholder wants to exit. Breaches typically involve selling shares without offering them to existing shareholders first, voting against agreed terms, or ignoring agreed exit procedures.

    Pre-emption rights require that shares be first offered to existing shareholders before any external sale. Breach occurs when a shareholder attempts to sell to a competitor or outsider without following this procedure. Voting covenant violations arise when a shareholder votes against agreed reserved matters, such as major capital expenditures or changes to the business plan. Exit procedure failures occur when shareholders attempt to exit without following contractually-mandated timelines or negotiation steps.

    Possible resolution mechanisms

    • Damages – i.e. monetary compensation for quantifiable losses
    • Injunctions – preventing threatened breaches or compelling specific performance
    • Forced share transfer – if the breach has the potential to destroy the working relationship
    • Without prejudice negotiations – settlement discussions to avoid litigation costs

    It is important to bear in mind that pre-action protocols require parties to exchange letters of claim, documents, and consider mediation before starting court proceedings.

    Share valuation disputes

    When shareholders cannot agree on what their shares are worth, disputes can quickly become expensive and adversarial. The disagreement often centres on which valuation method should apply and whether the shares should be discounted because they represent a minority stake.

    The courts recognise several valuation approaches depending on the company’s circumstances. Discounted cash flow (DCF) values a business based on its projected future earnings, making it suitable for profitable companies with steady cash flows. EBITDA multiples compare the company to similar businesses that have recently sold or are publicly traded. Net asset valuation simply adds up what the company owns minus what it owes, which works best for property-holding or investment companies. Fair market value represents what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller in an arm’s-length transaction.

    Resolving valuation disputes

    In recent years, we have observed that parties are increasingly opting for expert determination rather than court battles. An independent accountant or valuer examines the company’s finances and provides a binding valuation, usually within weeks rather than months or years. This approach saves substantial legal costs and maintains greater confidentiality than public court proceedings. Courts increasingly favour expert determination over adversarial expert evidence as it provides faster, more cost-effective resolution.

    Director misconduct disputes

    Directors owe several statutory duties under the Companies Act 2006, including the fundamental obligation to promote the success of the company. When directors breach these duties, shareholders often seek remedies ranging from removal to financial compensation. Misconduct takes many forms:

    • Misuse of company assets occurs when directors divert business opportunities or funds to personal benefit, such as self-dealing transactions or competing ventures.
    • Breach of fiduciary duties happens when directors act in conflicts of interest without proper disclosure to the board or shareholders.
    • Fraudulent or wrongful trading involves continuing to trade the company while insolvent or with intent to defraud creditors, a particularly serious breach.
    • Poor governance includes failure to exercise reasonable care, diligence, and skill in decision-making.

    Possible resolution mechanisms

    Shareholders have multiple options for addressing director misconduct. The simplest and most direct is removal by ordinary resolution (51% vote) under section 168 Companies Act 2006. This requires no court involvement, a shareholder resolution at a general meeting can remove a director immediately, though the director is entitled to speak in their own defence.

    Beyond removal, shareholders can pursue damages claims, recovering losses suffered by the company or individual shareholders. These claims require proof of the breach and quantifiable loss, making them more complex than removal votes. Injunctions prevent directors from continuing wrongful conduct, such as misusing company assets or pursuing competing business ventures. For more serious breaches affecting the company as a whole, shareholders can also bring derivative claims on behalf of the company to recover losses.

    Final Words

    Shareholder disputes rarely resolve quickly or cheaply. The sooner you seek legal advice when warning signs emerge such as unresolved disagreements, breaches of agreement, or unexplained director conduct, the better the outcome is likely to be. Most disputes that reach commercial litigation could have been settled at a fraction of the cost through early negotiation or mediation. If litigation becomes unavoidable, understanding which remedy applies to your circumstances allows you to pursue the most efficient resolution. Well-drafted shareholders agreements with clear deadlock provisions, pre-emption rights, and exit mechanisms prevent many disputes from arising in the first place.

    FAQs

    What is the cheapest way to resolve a shareholder dispute?

    Early negotiation and mediation is almost always the cheapest and fastest way to resolve a shareholder dispute. Pre-action protocols require ADR consideration anyway. For valuation disputes, an independent expert can provide a binding decision in weeks rather than months of court cases.

    Can I force a director out without going to court?

    Yes, you can remove a director by ordinary resolution (51% shareholder vote) at a general meeting under section 168 Companies Act 2006. This requires no court involvement, though the director is entitled to speak in their own defence before the vote.

    What happens if I breach a shareholders agreement?

    The other party can seek damages for losses, obtain court injunctions forcing compliance, or pursue forced share transfer if the breach is serious enough. Courts enforce shareholders agreements as binding contracts. You will also be required to engage in pre-action mediation, and failure to do so results in cost sanctions against you in any subsequent litigation.

    To discuss any points raised in this article, please call us on +44 (0) 203972 8469 or email us at mail@eldwicklaw.com.

    This article does not constitute legal advice. For further information, please contact our London office.

  • Can A Company Withhold  Documents From Investors In A Civil Fraud Claim?

    Can A Company Withhold  Documents From Investors In A Civil Fraud Claim?

    The High Court has ordered that Standard Chartered, the high-profile global bank, must hand over documents related to communications with US and Singaporean regulators. In doing so, it dismissed the company’s argument that it faced criminal prosecution if it disclosed the information to investors.

    Standard Chartered is currently embroiled in a £1.5 billion claim. Investors accused it of concealing critical information concerning sanctions breaches involving Iran. At issue were crucial regulatory disclosures and whether they were misleading or incomplete.

    Why does this matter? Because clear, accurate disclosure underpins investor rights, market integrity, and confidence in financial markets. Therefore, the ruling in Various Claimants v Standard Chartered PLC ordering disclosure provides clarity for investors in England and Wales who have investments in companies caught up in allegations of breaching UK, US, EU, or UN sanctions.

    Background: The Standard Chartered Sanctions Scandal

    Standard Chartered has made headlines in recent years for breaching Iran sanctions, prompting hefty fines from US and UK regulators. The bank was penalised for processing transactions that violated anti-money-laundering rules tied to Iranian interests. These incidents severely damaged its reputation and triggered internal regulatory overhauls.

    Between 2007 and 2019, StanChart issued investor communications, including prospectuses, that glossed over the real extent of its sanctions exposures. Those documents formed the backbone of investor expectations and are now the basis of legal claims.

    The Claimants and Their Allegations

    The claimants represent a coalition of more than 200 institutional investors, totalling around 1,400 funds. Their case is straightforward but far-reaching: they allege that Standard Chartered issued prospectuses and other disclosures that were untrue or misleading, failing to disclose regulatory breaches and thereby distorting investor understanding.

    The essence of the claim is based on “common reliance” or “fraud on the market” theory. In short, this doctrine provides that if a company makes a false or misleading statement that affects its share price, investors who bought or sold shares during that time can bring a civil claim against the company. Critically, the investors do not have to have read the documents containing the misleading statement themselves to claim reliance. What matters is that the misleading statement influenced the share value.

    Standard Chartered’s legal arguments

    Standard Chartered resisted disclosure at every turn, arguing that giving up certain documents would breach confidentiality duties and expose it to prosecution in the US and Singapore. Among the most sensitive materials were internal regulatory reports and communications with foreign authorities.

    The Civil Procedure Rules, Part 31, however, sets a firm test for disclosure. Documents are disclosable if they are relevant, in the party’s control, and not protected by privilege or confidentiality, such that non-disclosure would be just. The question for the court was – did legitimate privilege exist, or was this a shield against presenting inconvenient evidence?

    Judge Green’s Analysis and Ruling

    Judge Green delivered a firm answer. The asserted risk of prosecution abroad was found exaggerated, and there was no credible threat in the US or Singapore that could justify non-disclosure. The judge concluded that public policy favours disclosure in the interest of justice and the effective conduct of civil litigation.

    Ultimately, the court ordered full disclosure of the documents at issue, rejecting confidentiality claims in this context. The ruling underscores that confidentiality cannot be used to avoid presenting documents if, under the Civil Procedure Rules, transparency is clearly warranted.

    What does the decision in Various Claimants v Standard Chartered PLC mean in practice?

    This case marks a critical moment for common reliance or fraud on the market claims in England and Wales. Unlike the US, where such claims are well established, English courts have traditionally been cautious. The StanChart ruling gives new credibility to such claims, making them more viable and reinforcing investor protection.

    Previously, StanChart unsuccessfully attempted to strike out nearly half the claimants’ cases, which the court rejected. That decision showed the English courts’ willingness to allow such group claims to proceed.

    The potential liability for Standard Chartered is enormous, as a £1.5 billion claim is not merely symbolic. Prior fines and reputational damage leave the bank in a highly precarious position.

    The ruling sends a clear message to regulators and boards: transparency matters, and failure to secure it can result in both financial cost and erosion of market trust.

    What Happens Next?

    With disclosure ordered, the case moves into a crucial phase: reviewing the revealed documents, testing their impact, and preparing for trial. Standard Chartered may still seek an appeal, though its narrow window of confidentiality exception has been severely curtailed.

    Conclusion

    This case is a powerful reminder that transparency and accountability are not optional. The courts have taken a firm stand that excuses cannot justify withholding critical information in a civil fraud claim. For investors, it offers renewed hope that legal recourse remains alive where misstatements or omissions occur.

    FAQs

    What is a “common reliance” or “fraud on the market” claim?

    A legal theory where investors sue on the grounds they relied on public statements that were misleading. They need not prove personal reliance if the statements inflated the market as a whole.

    Why did Standard Chartered want to withhold documents?

    The bank claimed confidentiality and risk of foreign prosecution, particularly in the US and Singapore, as reasons not to disclose internal and regulatory materials.

    What did Judge Green decide about confidentiality?

    He ruled that the alleged prosecution risk was exaggerated and that confidentiality did not outweigh the importance of disclosure in civil justice.

    What does this mean for future investor litigation in England and Wales?

    It strengthens the standing of group investor claims, particularly those based on omissions or misleading disclosures, opening a door for broader securities litigation.

    How should financial institutions respond?

    They should review and enhance disclosure controls, ensuring investor communications are accurate, complete, and defensible, especially in multi-jurisdictional claims.

    To discuss any points raised in this article, please call us on +44 (0) 203972 8469 or email us at mail@eldwicklaw.com.

    Note: This article does not constitute legal advice. For further information, please contact our London office.

  • Eldwick Law Ranked Band 4 in Chambers UK 2026

    Eldwick Law Ranked Band 4 in Chambers UK 2026

    We are honoured to have been recognised by Chambers and Partners as a leading Dispute Resolution Specialist Firm, a category which highlights the UK’s foremost independent and conflict-free boutique practices dedicated to complex disputes and focused on delivering exceptional results in litigation, arbitration, and investigations.

    This recognition reflects the sophistication of our work, the quality of service we provide to our clients, and the dedication of our team in handling cross-jurisdictional disputes. Chambers describes our firm as “a notable international practice, boasting a strong reputation for acting on disputes involving parties based in the CIS and China. The firm has expertise in fraud and professional negligence matters, in addition to representing clients on the full range of corporate and commercial disputes”.

    Special congratulations to Jenna Krüger, recognised as a notable practitioner and described as “a partner who acts on global commercial disputes”.

    As we look ahead, we continue to refine our practice, broaden our international reach, and uphold the standards of excellence that define our approach to dispute resolution.

    We extend our sincere thanks to our clients and colleagues for their trust, support, and valuable feedback.

  • How to Remove a Company Director for Mismanagement

    How to Remove a Company Director for Mismanagement

    Can a company remove a director for mismanagement in the UK?

    Yes. Under UK company law, you can remove a company director for mismanagement but doing so requires a strategic, well-documented approach to minimise risk and ensure compliance with the Companies Act 2006.

    Director mismanagement may include:

    • Breaching statutory directors’ duties.
    • Failure to manage commercial and regulatory risks.
    • Lack of strategic leadership or competence.
    • Breach of fiduciary obligations.
    • Poor financial oversight or misuse of company funds.

    In my experience, once the relationship between a director and other board members deteriorates, trust is difficult to rebuild. Many companies wait too long to seek legal advice, increasing the chance of reputational and operational harm. If legal advice is sought early, non-litigious routes like negotiation or mediation may preserve company value and reduce tension.

    When trust is lost entirely, the business may have no option but to proceed with formal removal, especially if shareholders are concerned about corporate governance, investor confidence, or regulatory scrutiny.

    Can a director be removed without their consent in the UK?

    Yes. A company director can be removed without their consent under UK law. Section 168 of the Companies Act 2006 gives shareholders a statutory right to remove a director by ordinary resolution, regardless of any agreement between the director and the company.

    This means that:

    • The director’s approval is not required.

    • The board itself cannot prevent removal if shareholders hold a majority vote.

    • Any provision in the Articles of Association or service contract attempting to block removal will generally be ineffective against the statutory power.

    However, removal without consent does not eliminate contractual rights. A director may still bring claims for:

    • breach of contract,

    • wrongful dismissal, or

    • unfair dismissal (if also an employee).

    For this reason, companies should treat removal as both a corporate governance decision and a potential employment law process, ensuring procedural fairness throughout.

    Removing a director for misconduct or mismanagement

    Directors may be removed where misconduct or serious mismanagement undermines the company’s interests or breaches legal duties owed under the Companies Act 2006.

    Examples of misconduct may include:

    • Breach of directors’ duties under sections 171–177 Companies Act 2006.

    • Conflicts of interest or undisclosed personal benefit.

    • Misuse of company funds or assets.

    • Regulatory non-compliance exposing the business to risk.

    • Persistent failure to exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence.

    While UK law does not require shareholders to prove misconduct to remove a director under section 168, establishing clear evidence is often strategically important. Proper documentation helps:

    • justify the decision to investors and stakeholders,

    • defend potential employment tribunal claims,

    • reduce the risk of unfair prejudice allegations by shareholder-directors.

    In practice, companies should gather board minutes, financial records, internal complaints, and correspondence demonstrating the impact of the director’s conduct before initiating removal proceedings.

    Section 168 Companies Act 2006 explained

    Section 168 of the Companies Act 2006 is the primary legal mechanism allowing shareholders to remove a company director before the end of their term of office.

    Key features of section 168 include:

    1. Ordinary resolution required
    A simple majority vote (over 50%) of shareholders is sufficient.

    2. Special notice procedure
    Shareholders proposing removal must give at least 28 days’ special notice before the meeting.

    3. Director’s procedural rights
    The director has the right to:

    • receive notice of the resolution,

    • submit written representations, and

    • speak at the shareholder meeting.

    4. Statutory power overrides company documents
    Even if the Articles of Association or a shareholders’ agreement provide otherwise, section 168 generally prevails.

    Importantly, section 168 deals only with removal from office, not compensation or employment termination. Separate contractual obligations may continue to apply after removal.

    Because procedural mistakes can invalidate the resolution or trigger claims, companies should ensure strict compliance with statutory notice and filing requirements, including submitting Form TM01 to Companies House promptly after removal.

    What are the legal grounds for removing a director in England and Wales?

    Removal by ordinary resolution (section 168 Companies Act 2006)

    Shareholders can remove a director by passing an ordinary resolution with a simple majority (51%). To begin the process, members must serve a Special Notice at least 28 days before the shareholder meeting.

    The director:

    • Must be given formal notice.
    • Can submit written representations in support of their position.
    • Has the right to speak at the meeting.

    The company is also required to file Form TM01 with Companies House once the director is removed.

    Court-ordered removal

    If the company has evidence of unfair prejudice under section 994 Companies Act 2006, the shareholders may apply to court for relief. If successful, the court can order the removal of the director. However, the courts rarely grant this remedy unless the Claimant’s can show serious misconduct or abuse of power.

    Voluntary resignation

    Provided the company’s Articles of Association, Shareholders’ Agreement, and the Director’s Service Agreement allow it, a director may resign voluntarily. No notice period is typically required, although contractual obligations may still apply.

    The process: how to remove a director for mismanagement

    To remove a company director for mismanagement, follow these steps:

    1. Review company documents
      Examine the Articles of Association, Shareholders’ Agreement, and Directors’ Service Agreement. These may specify grounds and procedures for removal.
    2. Serve Special Notice (28 days)
      Give the company at least 28 days’ notice before the shareholder meeting. The notice must detail the proposed removal and be formally delivered to the company.
    3. Inform the director and consider their submissions
      The director has a right to submit written arguments and attend the meeting. Their representations should be read out if they cannot be circulated.
    4. Pass an ordinary resolution
      If more than 50% of shareholders vote in favour of removal, the resolution passes.
    5. File Form TM01 with Companies House which removes the director from the official register.

    Risks of improperly removing a director

    Removing a director for mismanagement is not without legal and reputational risk.

    Employment law consequences

    If the director is also an employee, dismissal may trigger an unfair dismissal claim. To avoid liability, the removal must fall within one of the five fair reasons for dismissal:

    • Capability or qualifications.
    • Conduct.
    • Redundancy.
    • Illegality (continued employment breaches the law).
    • Some other substantial reason (SOSR).

    A formal process with clear documentation is essential.

    Reputational damage and investor concern

    Poorly handled removals can raise alarm bells for:

    • Customers
    • Partners
    • Staff
    • Investors

    To minimise fallout, document:

    • Financial mismanagement or breaches of fiduciary duty.
    • Internal complaints or whistleblowing.
    • Shareholder concerns.
    • Correspondence between the director and board.

    Taking early legal advice and keeping a full paper trail will protect the company’s legal position and public image.

    FAQs

    Can a company director be removed without their consent in the UK?

    Yes. Under section 168 of the Companies Act 2006, shareholders can remove a director via ordinary resolution, even if the director does not agree.

    Is mismanagement a valid reason to remove a director in the UK?

    Yes. Mismanagement may constitute a breach of statutory duties or fiduciary obligations. It may also amount to a fair reason for dismissal if the director is also an employee.

    Can a director bring a claim after being removed?

    Yes. If the director is an employee, they may bring a claim for unfair dismissal or breach of contract. Shareholder-directors may also claim unfair prejudice if removal was part of broader exclusion tactics.

    What documents do I need to remove a director properly?

    Key documents include:

    • Articles of Association
    • Shareholders’ Agreement
    • Director’s Service Agreement
    • Board minutes
    • Form TM01 for Companies House
    Is legal advice necessary to remove a director in the UK?

    Strongly recommended. Removal has legal, commercial, and reputational consequences. A solicitor can guide you through the correct process and reduce risk.

    Getting Legal Help

    To find out more about how our Company Law Solicitors can help you with removing a director or any other company law matter, please call us on +44 (0) 203972 8469 or email us at mail@eldwicklaw.com.

    Note: This article does not constitute legal advice. For further information, please contact our London office.