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  • Furlough Fraud – Eldwick Law Fraud Solicitors

    Furlough Fraud – Eldwick Law Fraud Solicitors

    What is the furlough scheme?

    On 20 April 2020, the government introduced the ‘Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme’ (CJRS). This is commonly referred to as the ‘Furlough Scheme’. A furlough is defined as a ‘temporary leave of absence’ from work. Whilst this scheme is ultimately helping struggling businesses and individuals, there is scope for abuse of the system, also known as ‘furlough fraud’. It is important for individuals and businesses to understand the implications of the scheme and take steps to prevent fraud.

    The Chancellor took the unprecedented move of offering government assistance to all employers, operating on a PAYE scheme, who otherwise would not be able to pay their staff. To prevent redundancies, the government offered support by subsidising 80% of their wages. From 1 August 2020, the government will start to slowly withdraw their support. They will first require employers to meet National Insurance and pension contributions in August. Throughout September and October, the percentage of contribution to employees’ wages will subside. The scheme ends on 31st October 2020.

    Under the scheme employees are not allowed to undertake any work at all for their employer. This excludes training, for any hours that their employers claim furlough assistance from the government for.

    The CJRS has been hailed as a lifesaving measure to prevent mass unemployment and to support the ‘stay-at-home’ orders that were necessary to contain the pandemic. However, as the total cost of the scheme has swelled to £28.7bn in 12 July 2020, the obvious question becomes how the Treasury is going to be able to recoup on this unprecedented public investment.

    Furlough fraud

    In a powerful statement of intent, HMRC arrested a 57-year old man from Solihull for allegedly defrauding the CJRS of £495,000. The man had his bank accounts frozen and is alleged to be part of a wider multi-million-pound tax fraud. He is one of eight men from the West Midlands area to have been arrested as part of the investigation. Whilst the HMRC were forced to suspend its investigatory activities in April due to capacity issues, the department is back with a vengeance to clamp down on any instances of fraud.

    HMRC reported over 1,900 complaints in May alone. These were arising from alleged mis-use of the CJRS scheme. Employers were claiming government support for furloughed workers while still requiring those workers to come to work. This is a clear abuse of process. However, given the raft of Coronavirus assistance packages that have been on offer for employees, self-employed workers and small businesses , the lines are easily blurred. It can be easier than people think to essentially ‘double-claim’ on government assistance.

    HMRC have set out additional safeguards to prevent fraudulent activity within the scheme which include:

    • Proof that the employee was on the payroll from 28 February 2020, in order to prevent the creation of fake employees
    • The requirement for an employer to have already been authenticated by HMRC.
    • A four- to six-day processing period to make background checks, which should flag high-risk claims.
    • Checks made after payout to verify a claim was real.
    • A whistleblowing facility so that abuse can be reported.

    The Finance Bill 2020

    HMRC has indicated the new Finance Bill will offer a 90-day grace period. This will allow employers to refer themselves to the authorities. You can refer yourself if you believe you have benefitted too much from the CJRS and voluntarily submit yourself to a reassessment. HMRC will pursue enforcement proceedings all the way to criminal sanction for those deliberately attempting to defraud the scheme. They will show leniency in cases where over-benefitting from the scheme was not intentional and take a co-operative approach to employers who have sums that they might need to repay.

    If you are an employer benefitting from the furlough scheme, it is important to ensure you have complied with your relevant obligations. It is imperative to ensure you have read the relevant guidance, properly trained HR and payroll staff in the scheme and updated your policies and procedures.

    Eldwick Law has specialist practitioners able to give tailored advice to businesses of all sizes.

  • Franchise Disputes and Your Rights

    Franchise Disputes and Your Rights

    Our Franchise Solicitors outline your rights and advise on areas of your franchise taking advantage of the vast experience in commercial law and a variety of other legal areas that could impact your business.

    We provide you with practical and commercial advice in order to help you reach a resolution, whilst offering support from our forensic and accountancy experts.

    Should you have any queries with regard to this article or your specific situation, get in touch with our franchise solicitors.

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    An overview of franchise disputes and your rights

    Franchise disputes are far from uncommon and have recently been making headlines: the pizza chain, Dominos’, ongoing dispute in the UK with its franchisees over profit sharing, which in turn is affecting its ability to expand into other European territories, or even when hundreds of KFC branches ran out of chicken in 2018 resulting in a substantial loss of earnings for both the franchisor and its franchisees.

    Whether you are a franchisee or franchisor of a small national or large international business, it is important you know what your rights are in order to protect you/your business from any potential claim(s) that could follow.

    As there is no legislation in the UK that specifically regulates franchising (although there is a self-regulating body – the British Franchise Association), it is crucial that you understand the provisions set out in the Franchise Agreement and in the event of a dispute, approach experienced franchise litigation solicitors, as these types of claims can often become complicated and involve different areas of law, such as: intellectual property, contract, and insolvency.

    The Franchise Agreement

    The Franchise Agreement will govern the relationship between the parties. It will dictate the parties’ obligations to one another, and in most cases, is weighted heavily in favour of the franchisor.

    The Franchise Agreement will often stipulate the terms or process to be followed in the event of a dispute, such as mediation or arbitration. However, we understand that parties cannot always reach a settlement through Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) and you may therefore have no choice but to consider litigation.

    In the event of a breach, what remedies are available?

    Within contracts, terms can be classified as a condition, warranty, or innominate term. It is important to know the distinction between each as it will affect the remedy available to the non-defaulting party (i.e. the innocent party) for breach of contract. So, what do these terms mean?

    A condition goes to the “root” of the contract. If breached, then it gives the non-defaulting party the right to either affirm the contract (continue the relationship under the contract) or terminate the contract by way of a repudiatory breach.

    A repudiatory breach is a breach in a contractual relationship that is so serious, that it would entitle the non-defaulting party to the agreement to terminate it and that party would then be released from the terms of the contract. However, it is crucial that you are certain of your position, as there are associated risks if you get it wrong. A warranty on the other hand only entitles the non-defaulting party to claim damages, not to terminate the contract.

    An innominate term is somewhere in the middle. The non-defaulting party can terminate the agreement if a breach of that term is “sufficiently serious.” The test that is often applied is from the case of Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd and is whether the non-defaulting party is deprived of “substantially the whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract that it should obtain.” The remedies available will depend on whether it is held the breach substantially deprived the non-defaulting party of the whole benefit of the contract or not.

    If it is, then the remedy available would entitle that party to terminate or affirm the contract and claim damages. However, if not, then the remedy available would be for damages only.

    Breach and termination of your franchise agreement

    If you consider there has been a breach of the Franchise Agreement, can you terminate?

    Yes, firstly depending on what clause(s) has been breached and whether it is deemed to be a condition or innominate term.

    Secondly, the Franchise Agreement itself will normally have a detailed provision dealing with termination and what the parties are required to do, such as providing notice within a stipulated time frame and in a specific format for example.

    If there is a mistake in the way this is done then the party in breach could avoid liability on the basis of a technicality, so it is key that you obtain legal advice before considering terminating your Franchise Agreement. Thirdly, you should also seek advice on your rights and obligations in the event a franchisee has given a personal guarantee.

    What should you do in the event your business is failing or you cannot reach a resolution amongst yourselves? As each individual case will depend on the facts, you should seek legal advice immediately to avoid causing any further detriment to your business or prejudicing your position. At Eldwick Law, our franchise solicitors can assist you whether in ADR or from the pre-action stage through to the conclusion at trial.

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  • Does an Email Constitute a Legally Binding Contract?

    Does an Email Constitute a Legally Binding Contract?

    The recent case of Athena Brands Ltd v Superdrug Stores Plc [2019] EWHC 3505, highlights employee’s liability when negotiating a contract on behalf of their employer via email.

    For a legally binding contract to be formed, an offer, acceptance of that offer and consideration is required. There must also be certainty regarding the key terms of the agreement, and there must be intention by both parties to create legal relations.

    Where an employee (agent) seeks to contract with a third party on behalf of their employer (principle), the employee must have principle authority to do so. This requires an agreement between the agent and principle, for the agent to act on the principal’s behalf. This authority can be express or implied.

    Is an email legally binding?

    In Athena Brands Ltd v Superdrug Stores Plc [2019] EWHC 3503, an email exchange took place between a Superdrug Stores buyer and Athena Brands, a manufacturer, regarding the sale of a new cosmetic product.

    The exchange of emails set out that the product would be sold to the Defendant at a set price during a 12-month period, in which the Defendant could order consignments of stock at any time via purchase orders. The sale price would have exceeded £1.3m, but in response to slower than expected sales – Superdrug stopped placing orders. The manufacturer claimed nearly £980,000 in damages.

    The Claimant alleged that the agreement also included a commitment by the Defendant to purchase a minimum amount of £1.3m of stock during this period, which the Defendant disputed on the basis that they were not committed to purchasing any products unless and until it submitted a specific purchase order.

    The Defendant alleged that there was nothing in Superdrug’s standard terms and conditions of purchase to indicate that they would agree terms for purchasing minimum quantities or would be bound by any such terms if an employee agreed them.

    The email containing the proposed terms was sent by the Claimant’s employee to the Buyer at the Defendant on 23 May 2017 and said:

    “Just to confirm, you are placing orders and committing to the yearly quantity against all lines detailed below…. We have agreed that you will call off stock… on an ad hoc basis within a 12-month period…. [there followed a table of products with quantities and prices] If you could drop me a note to confirm all the above ASAP that would be great, I shall then be in a position to push the button at this end.”

    The Buyer replied on 25 May 2017, stating:

    “Please go ahead with the below [referring to the claimant’s previous email and preceding chain], happy on Nature’s Alchemist…”

    The High Court found that there was a clear acceptance of Superdrug’s commitment to buying annual quantities of the product from the manufacturer. The Court ruled that nothing in Superdrug’s evidence showed that the claimant was unreasonable when it relied on the Defendant’s confirmation as binding the company.

    The Defendant’s failure to make the claimant aware of Superdrug’s policies which governed the negotiation of purchase contracts was particularly relevant to the Court’s ruling. It was found, had they done so, the outcome would likely have been different.

    Despite the fact the contract was agreed via an email exchange, it was found to be sufficiently clear to create a liability of £1.3m on the part of the Defendant. This highlights the dangers that businesses face when discussing contract terms in any sort of written form and that a legally binding contract contains a number of components that the court will assess objectively to determine validity.

    This case also serves as a reminder for employers to make clear to employees their responsibilities when acting on their employer’s behalf and the risks of failing to do so.

    At Eldwick Law, we have an expert team of contract lawyers who can assist with your claim.

    Should you have any queries with regard to this article, please do not hesitate to contact us via email: mail@eldwicklaw.com, or telephone: +44(0)203 972 8469.

     

  • Coronavirus Advance Fee Fraud

    Coronavirus Advance Fee Fraud

    Coronavirus advance fee fraud: the NHS has warned households to be vigilant about fraudsters sending out fake invitations to have the coronavirus vaccination. 

    The warning comes amid an increasing number of complaints being made about scammers attempting steal individuals’ personal details or extract payments from them. According to Action Fraud, there have been more than 1,000 reports of email scams claiming to offer vaccines in just 24 hours this week. 

    In one case, a 92-year-old woman in London was charged £160 and administered with a fake vaccine, which she was told would be reimbursed to her by the NHS. 

    Fraudsters are also sending out scam emails which include a link to register for the vaccine, and asking individuals to provide their bank details to verify their identification or make payment. 

    The NHS says that it would never ask for bank details, as the vaccine is free and no registration is required either. 

    These scams are, of course, classic examples of advance fee frauds. An advance fee fraud is one of the most common types of confidence tricks, and typically involves promising the victim a significant share or a large sum of money, or in this case a highly sought after vaccination, in return for a small amount of money up front. 

    For more information on how our expert fraud solicitors can help you, visit our Advance Fee Fraud Page

    If you would like to know how NHS would contact you, follow this link:
    Coronavirus Scam

  • The Court of Appeal Decision in Jet2 Holidays Limited v Hughes & Hughes [2019] on Contempt of Court Jurisdiction – A Year On.

    The Court of Appeal Decision in Jet2 Holidays Limited v Hughes & Hughes [2019] on Contempt of Court Jurisdiction – A Year On.

    Subject: The impact of the findings in the Jet2 Holidays Limited v Hughes & Hughes [2019] EWCA Civ 1858 on the development of the Pre-Action Protocol, as considered by the Civil Justice Council.

    Late last year the Court of Appeal handed down a landmark ruling confirming that the High Court did have jurisdiction to commit the respondents in the Jet2 Holidays Limited v Hughes & Hughes [2019] EWCA Civ 1858 for contempt of court for submitting false statements of truth at the pre-action protocol stage. A year on, the Civil Justice Council is considering the effects of the findings of Sir Terence Etherton MR, Hamblen LJ (now Lord Hamblen, Justice of the UKSC), and Flaux LJ in the context of Pre-Action Protocol Review. 

    In the Jet2 Holidays Limited, the respondents booked an all-inclusive package holiday with the appellant. The respondents later gave notice to the appellant of a claim for damages for holiday sickness – they alleged that they had contracted food poisoning as a result of eating contaminated food or drink at the hotel. In purported compliance with the Personal Injury Claims Pre-Action Protocol (PAP) each respondent provided the appellant with witness statements describing how they believed their sickness was caused as a result of the undercooked food and unhygienic conditions in the Spanish hotel. Each respondent signed a statement of truth contained within their respective witness statements. 

    The appellant subsequently obtained various images, videos and comments posted by the respondents on social media during their holiday on which both respondents and their children appeared physically well and seemed to be having an enjoyable stay at the hotel. The appellants rejected the respondents’ potential claim, and the respondents decided not to pursue their claim for damages further. As a result, the proceedings were never issued against the appellant. 

    In turn, the appellant sought permission to commence committal proceedings against the respondents for the contempt of court under CPR Part 81 on the basis that the allegedly false witness statements were made by the respondents, verified by a statement of truth, contrary to CPR r.32.14. HHJ Godsmark QC, sitting as Deputy High Court Judge, granted permission and listed the committal proceedings for a CCMC. However, at the CCMC hearing, which was listed before a different judge, a question arose as to whether or not the High Court had jurisdiction to commit in the light of the fact that no proceedings had ever been issued. Eventually, HHJ Robert Owen QC concluded that the High Court did not have such jurisdiction and struck out the application.

    On the appeal from that decision the Court of Appeal unanimously held that the High Court did in fact have jurisdiction to commit for contempt of court even though no claim for damages had been issued. It was held that it was sufficient that the false statements, endorsed by the statements of truth, were used during the pre-action protocol stage. In the words of the Lords Justices: 

    “36. A dishonest witness statement served in purported compliance with a PAP is capable of interfering with the due administration of justice for the purposes of engaging the jurisdiction to commit for contempt because PAPs are now an integral and highly important part of litigation architecture.”

    The decision has had a significant impact on the law around contempt and how the parties view pre-action correspondence. Firstly, CPR r.32.14 has been amended to reflect the Jet2 Holidays Limited v Hughes decision. 

    Secondly, the rules around bringing contempt proceedings have been simplified by the introduction of an updated version of CPR Part 81, which came into in force on 1 October 2020. The new version of Part 81 has reduced the number of rules from 38 to 10, which lay out a clear procedure for the commencement of contempt of court proceedings. The new approach for punishment in contempt proceedings was considered by the High Court in the recent decision in Oliver v Shaikh [2020] EWHC 2658 (QB).

    Thirdly, the Civil Justice Council (CJC) has launched a review of the Pre-action Protocols. The CJC is currently running a survey inviting anyone with experience of, or an interest in, Civil Procedure Rules to express their views on Pre-action Protocols. The survey will be open until Friday 18 December 2020. 

  • Reflective Loss: A Clarification by the Supreme Court

    Reflective Loss: A Clarification by the Supreme Court

    On the 15th July 2020 the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in the case of Sevilleja v Marex Financial Ltd [2020] UKSC 31. In this case the court grappled with the history and development of the ‘Reflective Loss’ principle and was tasked with clarifying the width of its applicability.

    Facts of the Case

    The original case was brought by an investment company, Marex Financial Ltd (‘Marex’). This was against Mr Sevilleja, the owner and controller of two companies incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. Marex had obtained judgment against the two companies, which were vehicles through which Mr Sevilleja conducted foreign exchange trading. Mr Sevilleja was accused of moving the two companies’ assets out of the jurisdiction, into accounts under his personal control. This was done in such a way as to deprive Marex of being able to enforce the judgment. Marex issued against Mr Sevilleja personally for the judgment sums, interest and costs of pursuing him. Mr Sevilleja resisted their action, contending that Marex could sue him for the losses incurred to the BVI companies, which have been placed in voluntary insolvent liquidation and relied on ‘Reflective Loss’.

    What is Reflective Loss?

    The principle has emerged from a line of cases spawned from the ancient judgment in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. In that case it was decided that the only person who can seek relief for an injury done to a company, where the company has a cause of action, is the company itself.

    This case was followed by that of Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 which applied the principle in a modern context. It was held that in a situation where a company suffers loss, which in turn affects the value of shares held by a shareholder, the principle in Foss applies to prevent the company and its shareholders both suing for the loss. Only one of those two claims can proceed and Foss makes clear that it is the company that should be preferred.

    It is at this point that the Lord Reed, in the present case before the Supreme Court, determined that things went wrong. The court in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 made several determinations that purported to follow Prudential but, in the view of Lord Reed, misinterpreted the core of that judgment. It was held by Lord Millet in Johnson that the basis of the decision in Prudential was a desire by the court to avoid double recovery. This led to a focus, by the benches that followed, on avoiding circumstances whereby anyone connected to a company, that had a right of action in a dispute, could recover for their loss – even in circumstances where the company chose to do nothing about their right of action. The latter circumstance was justified with reference to a secondary desire expounded by Lord Millet to preserve company autonomy. It was held in Johnson that a company’s refusal to prosecute its right of action in such a way as to compensate its creditors or shareholders was, in a sense, a novus actus. It wasn’t the original defendant who had resulted in the shareholder/creditor not being able to recover their losses by remedying the original wrong done to the company, but the company itself.

    How was Johnson Wrongly Decided?

    Lord Reed was respectfully critical of Lord Millet’s interpretation of the reasoning in Prudential and concluded that he had departed too far from the very limited scope that Prudential was intended to have. Lord Reed determined that there were two fundamental assertions that gave rise to Lord Millet’s misadventure. The first being a misjudgement of what shareholding in a company actually represents. He described a share as representing “a proportionate part of the company’s net assets” and that “if these are depleted the diminution in its assets will be reflected in the diminution in the value of the shares”. Lord Reed disagreed, instead concluding that shares are simply “a right of participation in the company on the terms of the articles of association”. He goes on to highlight that it is an “unrealistic assumption that there is a universal and necessary relationship between changes in a company’s net assets and changes in its share value”. Lord Reed also determined that to view Prudential, and therefore Foss, through the lens of ‘double-recovery’ was to mischaracterise the nature of legal loss. By linking the value of the loss to the company intrinsically to the value of the shares, Lord Millet is conceding that the shareholder has suffered a legal loss – albeit one that he then denies them recovery for. Lord Reed concludes that this is a perversion of Foss and entirely not what Prudential intended. He concluded that those two cases, when read together, in fact do not recognise the reduction in value of a company’s shares (as a result of a wrong done to it) as being a legal loss at all.

    Lord Reed, in support of his conclusion, highlighted the principal logical inconsistency with the fact that Lord Millet’s approach to Reflective Loss was based upon avoiding ‘double-recovery’ but led to situations where neither the company nor its shareholders had recovered for an actionable loss.

    Conclusion

    Lord Reed concluded in Sevilleja that “the critical point is that the shareholder has not suffered a loss which is regarded by the law as being separate and distinct from the company’s loss, and therefore has no claim to recover it.” This is contrasted against creditors or employees, who may have other rights of action that arise separately from any shareholding, and does not prejudice those parties from pursuing their cases, as the law would otherwise allow. Thus it can be said that the rule on ‘Reflective Loss’ has been narrowed to account for what Lord Reed would suggest was a wrong-turn at Johnson that opened the door to the principle from Foss being more widely interpreted than the judgment in Prudential intended.

    It is important that those wishing to invoke the exception to the rule against reflective loss carefully explore whether claims can be brought by the company, rather than shareholders or creditors. It is crucial that legal advice is obtained early on to clarify the claimants position. At Eldwick Law, we are experts in commercial law. Contact our commercial lawyers today for a consultation.

  • Breach of Planning Enforcement Notices and Confiscation

    Breach of Planning Enforcement Notices and Confiscation

    The recent case of R (Kombou) v Wood Green Crown Court is a sobering lesson for anyone facing a criminal prosecution, and who is considering pleading guilty with potential Confiscation proceedings looming.

    Case background

    The defendant entered guilty pleas at the Magistrates’ Court to breaches of a Local Authority (Enfield Council) planning enforcement notice. The offences related to unauthorised conversion of a house into 8 separate units.

    The defendant sought to change his plea when the matter was committed to the Crown Court and the Local Authority pursued Confiscation proceedings. He applied to vacate his guilty plea but the Crown Court refused his application.

    The defendant challenged, by way of Judicial Review, the Crown Court’s decision to refuse permission to vacate his guilty plea. The defendant argued that the Local Authority was improperly motivated because of the benefit which they would derive from the Home Office’s Asset Recover Incentivisation Scheme (“ARIS”).

    The High Court rejected his challenge, finding that the fact that the Local Authority had considered bringing confiscation proceedings did not mean the decision to prosecute had been motivated by an improper consideration; there was nothing to support the argument that the decision to prosecute was improperly motivated.

    There is some background to the case but one of the reasons the defendant pleaded guilty was because he thought it was possible that the case might end without Confiscation proceedings.

    Local Authorities are increasingly relying on planning enforcement notices to prosecute and recover any ‘ill gotten gains’. Local Authorities will receive 37.5% of the money recovered – it’s big business, and so one may naturally be critical of the motivations to prosecute here. The Court concluded that there were no improper motivations in this case, however.

    How can we help?

    If you are facing a Local Authority investigation or prosecution, it’s important to get early advice from an experienced team of lawyers. Early representation can make all the difference.

  • Unexplained Wealth Orders: Justified Seizure?

    Unexplained Wealth Orders: Justified Seizure?

    Unexplained Wealth Orders (“UWO”) are posing an increasing threat to the assets of private individuals. At a moment’s notice, authorities such as the HMRC and CPS can seize assets where they suspect the property is criminal property. The economy has taken a significant knock and all of the signs suggest authorities such as the HMRC are looking to UWO rather than proceed by way of a criminal prosecution.

    Put simply, a UWO requires the responding party to explain what interest they have in whatever property is named in the order, how they obtained the property, and how it is held.

    Applications for such orders can be made without notice to the High Court by enforcement authorities including the Serious Fraud Office, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, and the National Crime Agency. Applicants must:

    1. Specify or describe the property in respect of which the order is sought; and

    2. Specify the person who they believe holds the property.

    The threshold tests for obtaining an order are relatively low. Before deciding whether to issue a UWO, the court needs to be satisfied of the following:

    1. That there is reasonable cause to believe the respondent holds the property;

    2. That the value of the property is greater than £50,000;

    3. That there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the known sources of the respondent’s lawfully obtained income would have been insufficient to enable the respondent to obtain the property;

    Thereafter, for most applications, the court will be asked to consider there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person affected by the order or a person connected with that person is or has been involved in serious crime (whether in the UK or elsewhere).

    Many commentators discussing UWO focus on people suspected to have suspicious political connections or “politically exposed persons” (PEP). It is important to stress, UWO have an impact well beyond PEP and can affect any individual.

    If the individual does not provide satisfactory evidence of how their assets were acquired, these assets can be held as ‘recoverable property’ for the purposes of a civil recovery order under the Proceeds of Crime Act.

    The order may also be accompanied by an interim freezing order, as an unexplained wealth order alone will only lead to investigation, rather than the assets being frozen or seized. This is typically imposed to prevent any assets being disposed of before the unexplained wealth order process is complete. However, this could lead to a number of innocent people fighting to retain their assets on the basis of an assumption of fraud.

    In National Crime Agency v Baker and ors [2020] EWHC 822 (Admin), the High Court discharged three unexplained wealth orders brought against two high profile Kazakhstan individuals relating to three London properties worth over £80m. In this case, following a detailed examination of the evidence, the court found the source of ownership of the properties were no longer unexplained. In this case, all properties were subject to freezing orders whilst the unexplained wealth order process was being carried out.

    Whilst it is a complex task for agencies to prove how individuals obtained their wealth and identify ownership of assets, especially overseas, it seems that unexplained wealth orders are being used as an alternative to impair the individual in question, as it would be onerous to arrest and charge the individual with a criminal offence based on investigative purposes.

    Further, this type of order places the burden on the individual, rather than the enforcement agency to evidence the source of the wealth. The threshold for an obtaining an order is relatively low as the civil standard of proof applies, making it easy for agencies to pursue anyone they believe worth investigating. The authorities only have to be satisfied that the evidence is strong enough on the balance of probabilities that there has been a serious criminal act.

    In Baker, the Court emphasised the relatively limited purpose of UWOs as an investigative tool as once property and asset ownership has been explained, the purpose of the order falls away. The nature of an unexplained order seems draconian and unnecessary, especially as it places such as unfair burden on the individual. It seems these orders are being used as an alternative for bringing criminal charges, making it wholly unfair on the individual. The individual in question must prove the burden themselves and undergo an investigation, whilst their assets are likely to be frozen and tried without a jury. This seems wholly unfair and a cause for change regarding the nature of unexplained wealth orders, due to their detrimental effect on those who could be innocent individuals.

    Being investigated can be extremely daunting and as the threshold for investigation is low, it is crucial that you obtain the right legal guidance as early as possible. Eldwick Law have a team of lawyers who are experts in this area of law and can assist you with your case, no matter how big or small.

  • The Impact of COVID-19 on Commercial Contracts

    The Impact of COVID-19 on Commercial Contracts

    COVID-19 has changed the scope of business contracts in a variety of ways including the performance of contractual obligations. It is important for businesses to recognise their legal standing and the contractual issues they may be facing in light of coronavirus, so that they are not exposed to a claim for damages.

    Whether a party can suspend or terminate a contract due to the current climate will depend on a number of factors and the specific circumstances of the contractual terms in question.

    Force Majeure

    Unforeseen circumstance clauses contained within contracts are often expressly referred to in force majeure clauses in contracts. A force majeure clause will typically allow parties to renegotiate, extend, suspend and/or terminate the performance of the contract when an unforeseen or unexpected event has occurred. Force majeure is not a doctrine of English common law, meaning it is not implied in a contract. Therefore, parties wishing to rely on this clause must expressly insert a force majeure clause into a contract to rely upon it. Parties will often insert a force majeure clause to allocate risk between them when negotiating the drafting of a contract. Unexpected global events, such as the Coronavirus pandemic has the obvious ability to significantly disrupt the performance of a contract and is an example of where some force majeure clauses would be scrutinised quite carefully for who ultimately bears the loss.

    Is COVID-19 a force majeure event?

    Force majeure clauses must be specific, as the consequences of an unexpected event will be determined by the interpretation of the clause by the courts. The clauses will be examined in great detail to determine whether they can be taken to cover the intervening event and to ascertain whether the event is materially relevant to the performance of the contractual obligations in question. Whether a force majeure clause has been triggered in a contract will depend entirely on the exact wording that the parties have used, this often includes a non-exhaustive list of events. For example the presence of words such as: “pandemic”, “epidemic”, “outbreak”, “government action”, or “crisis” will be crucial in parties being able to argue that their force majeure clauses apply to the current circumstances.

    It is the duty of the party seeking to rely on the clause to prove that the force majeure event has significantly prevented or delayed them from performing their contractual duties. Classic Maritime Inc v Limbungan Makmur [2019] EWCA Civ 1102 suggests that the party looking to rely on a force majeure clause must have been willing and ready to perform the contract, even if the exceptional event had not occurred. The unexpected event must be the cause of the failure to perform the contract, rather than an excuse if the underlying problem is something else. Therefore, to give a current example, it isn’t enough that COVID-19 was around at the same time as the breach of contract, it has to be the cause of the breach.

    The English courts have previously not looked particularly favourably on reliance of force majeure clauses. However, the current climate makes it more likely than ever that parties will try to rely on force majeure clauses; due to the vast economic impact the pandemic is having on society and in turn, the impact it will have on the ability to perform contractual obligations. The Courts will not offer general guidance for this particular area of law, rather they will consider the cases on their individual merits.

    What if the contract does not include a force majeure clause?

    If force majeure is not a clause defined within a contract, parties may try to rely on specified time periods, which could warrant automatic termination. Parties will often scour their contracts for any clauses which provide flexibility, such as an option for the parties to terminate or renegotiate the contract, or any redress clauses. These clauses would need to be specifically drafted within the contract for them to take effect.

    Further, if a force majeure clause cannot be invoked, parties may seek to rely on the frustration of a contract to bring the contract to an end. A contract can be frustrated when something occurs after the formation of a contract, rendering it impossible to fulfil. Similar to force majeure, the burden of proof for frustration is on the person seeking to assert it. COVID-19 may possibly be a factor that parties can rely on when considering if their commercial contract has been frustrated, however this will heavily depend on the circumstances and wording of the individual contract and will often require parties taking detailed specialist advice.

    The realities of a global pandemic may require parties to be forced to re-negotiate aspects of a contract if the situation changes, since each contract is analysed on its own merits; however this would need to involve constructive communication between all parties involved and potentially the involvement of specialist providers of mediation services. It is important to understand the different legal and practical implications of that COVID-19 might have on current or future commercial contracts.

    Our commercial contract lawyers are experts in this field and can provide practical and specialist advice during this difficult time.

    Should you have any queries with regard to this article, please do not hesitate to contact us via email: mail@eldwicklaw.com, or telephone: +44(0)203 972 8469.

  • Gate Ventures Administration Claim

    Gate Ventures Administration Claim

    On 13 March 2020 the High Court decided that Gate Ventures PLC, a company specialising in media and entertainment investment previously chaired by Lord Grade, will enter into administration. The company’s management faced accusations of mismanagement and misapplication of monies which resulted in the company falling into serious financial difficulties. Eldwick Law represented a number of Chinese individuals with small shareholdings in their fight to uncover the truth.

    Gate Ventures was founded in 2015 by the legendary British songwriter and composer Geoff Morrow whose compositions were performed by stars including Barry Mannilow and Elvis Presley. The company invested in start-ups, films and had backed stage-shows such as 42nd Street and Sunset Boulevard. Gate Ventures initially saw a surge in its share price of 55% when it debuted on the AIM market and was once backed by several prominent investment organisations.

    However, the company’s fortunes were much changed by March 2020. It was alleged that Gate Ventures’ management had fallen into farce under the chairmanship of Jonny Hon, a prominent businessman based in Hong Kong. The court heard of how Mr Hon spent thousands of pounds of company money on lavish meals with foreign dignitaries, including President Obama’s press-secretary and Prince Albert of Monaco, as well as private tours of exclusive fashion houses. The court heard how Sarah Ferguson the Duchess of York, a one-time member of Gate Ventures’ board of directors, had rendered invoices of £200,000 for branding and marketing for her company ‘Ginger and Moss’ and had received £90,000 in loans from Gate Ventures which had yet to be repaid.

    Lord Grade, another director and presiding chairman of Gate Ventures at the time proceedings came to court, presented the defence on behalf of the company’s management following the withdrawal of their lawyers for non-payment of legal fees. Lord Grade admitted that spending limits were not in place during the chairmanship of Mr Hon but asserted that he had presided over the emplacement of strict financial controls and that the company was close to being revived through a series of high-profile investments. However, the company’s defence ran into real difficulties when Lord Grade was unable to offer any answer to claims made by the Applicant’s lawyers that Gate Ventures inexplicably spent £1 million to buy shares in a dormant company with no assets, whose directors included members of the board of Gate Ventures, and had made a series of loans to other board members without the requisite shareholder approvals.

    The court heard how Gate Ventures had posted losses of £19.5 million despite investments of approximately £24.5 million, some of which had come from an array of smaller investments made by individual Chinese consumers who had secured ‘Intervenor’ status and were represented by Eldwick Law. The company’s dire financial situation was compounded by the fact it owed £2.5 million to Chinese businessman and shareholder Zheng Youngxiong, who had launched the principal action after the company had proven itself unlikely to be able to repay him by the looming contractually-agreed deadline. Lawyers for the Applicant and the Intervenor expressed their disbelief that a company of once such significant assets could be reduced to being unable to pay its own accountants and lawyers, to which Lord Grade and his team of informal advisors had no substantive explanation.

    No doubt Lord Grade had hoped to be able to replicate the defence mounted by the company earlier in the year, where the court had denied Mr Youngxiong’s application to place Gate Ventures into administration on the strength of the all-star cast of board members that included Lord Grade (former Director of Programmes at the BBC) and the Duchess of York among others. The judge highlighted on that occasion that he was willing to give the board a chance to enact a rescue plan they had presented to the court, but placed the company under an obligation to produce fortnightly financial reports to monitor its progress. But with neither the mandated reports or any of the envisioned investment having materialised by the hearing in March and with a number of high-profile resignations from the board, including the Duchess of York, and the withdrawal of the company’s lawyers – the situation looked bleak for Lord Grade and his team.

    Attempts by Lord Grade to adjourn proceedings to seek alternative advice or to raise additional funds from creditors, who were said to be ‘waiting in the wings’, were robustly opposed by the applicants and ultimately refused by the court. Further attempts to place Gate Ventures into Members’ Voluntary Liquidation, a technical process whereby a company is liquidated and any remaining equity distributed to its creditors and shareholders, was similarly opposed and rejected. It was concluded that the company was in such dire financial straits that it was unlikely to survive the 21-day process without being wound up by its creditors and there was no guarantee of the process being approved by Gate Ventures’ shareholders in any event.

    Ultimately the court held that Gate Ventures should be placed into administration to protect the interest of major creditors such as Mr Youngxiong and those of the smaller individual Chinese investors – many of whom had been induced into investing by dazzling roadshows and the extravagant social-media profile of Mr Jonny Hon. It is hoped that, by being placed in administration, Gate Ventures has a chance of returning to the profitable past it once knew and of producing the kinds of returns expected by its shareholders and creditors.